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NOTES
FOURTH AND GOAL: PLAYER RESTRAINTS
IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, A LOOK BACK
AND A LOOK AHEAD
The application of antitrust law to professional sports was ini-
tially examined in 1914.1 Since that time, many professional ath-
letes have resorted to antitrust litigation to challenge restraints
imposed upon them by various leagues.2 Although player re-
straints differ in form depending on the sport in question,3 the
legal ramifications are always the same: player restraints in pro-
fessional sports restrict free competition for jobs, and may there-
fore violate federal antitrust law.
Most suits have challenged the barriers to free agency,4 which
is the ability of a player to move from one team to another once
1 See American League Baseball Club v. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1914); in-
fra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing Chase); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407
U.S. 258 (1972) (suggesting that special treatment given to professional baseball
should end with legislative, not judicial resolution); Toolson v. New York Yankees,
Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (allowing judicially-established exception to antitrust law for
professional baseball); Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
2 See, e.g., McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. Mich. 1978),
vacated, 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738
(D.D.C. 1976), modified, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp.
1000 (D. Minn. 1975), modified, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S.
801 (1977); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc.,
351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
3 See WALTER T. CHAwPIoN, JR., FUNDAmENTALs OF SPORTS LAW § 26.3, at 465-66
(1990) ("Player restraints can take a variety of forms, but mostly they will restrict
either player mobility or the player's ability to negotiate increases in salary.").
4 See, e.g., Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (involving claim
that NBA draft, uniform player contract, and reserve clause violated antitrust laws);
Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (finding NFL reserved and draft sys-
tems violated antitrust laws), affd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
907 (1979).
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the contract with his original team has expired.5 Players believe
that restraints on mobility interfere with the freedom to work
where they wish at a salary determined by the free market. Team
owners, however, defend their restraint practices primarily on the
basis that they help maintain competitive parity within the re-
spective leagues.7
This Note traces the history of challenges to player restraints
as violations of federal antitrust law. Part I reviews the substan-
tive antitrust and labor law principles which have been applied in
sports cases and discusses baseball's unique exemption from the
antitrust laws. Part II explores various player restraints em-
ployed by sports leagues and the manner in which courts have ad-
dressed them, highlighting the current application of these re-
straints in collective bargaining agreements ("CBAs"). Part III
uses empirical data regarding league economics and competitive
balance to examine the impact of free agency on professional
sports. Finally, Part IV proposes a free agency system which can
be incorporated into future CBAs. This section is particularly rel-
evant in light of the recently resolved struggle between the NFL
and its players, which culminated in a new agreement on free
agency.8
5 See WARREN FREEDMAN, PROFEssIONAL SPORTS AND ANTITRUST 18 (1987);
GEORGE W. SCHUBERT ET AL., SPORTS LAw 125 (1986); NHL BY-LAw § 9A.1 (on file
with ST. JoHN's LAw REVIEW) ("[A] player... who becomes a free agent ... shall have
the right to negotiate and contract with any Member club . ").
6 See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 265-66 (1972); Mackey, 407 F. Supp. at
1005-07; Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 873-74; see also Michael S. Hobel, Application of
the Labor Exemption After the Expiration of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Pro-
fessional Sports, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 164, 165 (1982) (noting that courts recognize that
player restraints restrict competition for jobs).
7 See, e.g., Mackey, 543 F.2d at 621; McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 460 F.
Supp. 904, 909 (E.D. Mich. 1978), vacated, 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979); Smith v.
Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 745 (D.D.C. 1976), modified, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); see also infra note 249 and accompanying text (noting that justification for
restraints is to preclude wealthy teams from signing best players).
8 Leonard Shapiro, Labor Peace NFL's Top Priority; Tagliabue Warns That Right
Form of Free Agency Must Be Found, WASH. PosT, Oct. 30, 1992, at C5. Reggie White
filed a class action suit seeking to have 300 players declared unrestricted free agents
after February 1, 1993. Id. The suit was settled, and a new seven-year agreement was
signed by the NFL and its players. Gary Myers, NFL, Players Reach Accord, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 7, 1993, at 59.
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I. ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
A The Relevant Antitrust and Labor Law
In order to gain a clear understanding of the application of
antitrust law to player restraints, it is necessary to examine three
judicially created antitrust doctrines: the nonstatutory labor ex-
emption from antitrust law,9 per se violations of the Sherman An-
titrust Act,10 and the Rule of Reason.'1
1. The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption from Antitrust Law
The nonstatutory labor exemption shields the results of col-
lective bargaining from antitrust scrutiny 2 when there has been
"good-faith and arms-length negotiation between the employer
9 See Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040
(1991); see also Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports,
1989 DuE L.J. 339 (1989) (concluding that labor law exemption expired simultane-
ously with collective bargaining agreement in NFL-NFLPA dispute); Rondell Marks,
Labor and Antitrust: Striking a Balance Without Balancing, 35 Am. U. L. REV. 699
(1986) (establishing tests for labor exemption, eliminating need to balance interests of
labor and antitrust laws on case-by-case basis); Note, Releasing Superstars from Pe-
onage: Union Consent and the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption, 104 HARv. L. REv. 874
(1991) (arguing that union consent must be prerequisite to availability of nonstatu-
tory labor exemption) [hereinafter Releasing Superstars].
10 See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (effort to
stop discounters from selling Chevrolet automobiles); Paramount Famous Lasky
Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930) (film distributors would not do business
with exhibitors not signing standard contract); see also Curtis J. Polk, Should Market
Power Be a Surrogate For Balancing in Applying the Rule-of-Reason?, 55 GEO. WASH.
L. Ruv. 764, 769 n.34 (1987) (listing per se violation cases).
11 See Ernest Gellhorn & Teresa Tatham, Making Sense Out of the Rule of Rea-
son, 35 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 155 (1985).
12 Releasing Superstars, supra note 9, at 877 n.27. The statutory labor exemp-
tion, in contrast, protects union bargaining activities from antitrust liability. Id.
The nonstatutory labor exemption originated in response to a pair of Supreme
Court decisions which found activities of labor unions to be violations of the Sherman
Act. See FEUx FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR lINUNOTION 139-42
(1930). In Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), the Court held that boycott of those
who deal with the employer (secondary boycott) in order to compel unionization of the
employer's shop violated the Sherman Act. Id. at 292-95. No distinction was made
between combinations of capital and combinations of labor:
[Tlhe source of the evil was not regarded as material, and the evil in its
entirety is dealt with. They made the interdiction include combinations of
labor as well as of capital; in fact, all combinations in restraint of commerce,
without reference to the character of the persons who entered into them.
Id. at 302.
Similarly, in Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911), the
Court enjoined a boycott orchestrated by a labor union against its employer. It was
wary of the potential for harm of such actions:
1993]
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But the very fact that it is lawful to form these bodies, with multitudes
of members, means that they have thereby acquired a vast power, in the
presence of which the individual may be helpless. This power, when unlaw-
fully used against one, cannot be met, except by his purchasing peace at the
cost of submitting to terms .... [Ilt is the duty of government to protect the
one against the many, as well as the many against the one.
Id. at 439. As a result of these cases, Congress was pressured by the unions for protec-
tion out of fear that the courts would destroy their movement. See FRANKFURTER &
GREENE, supra.
Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1992), was Congress' response. It
provides that:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor... organizations ... or to forbid or restrain
individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the le-
gitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members
thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
Id.
In addition, Section 20 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1992), substantially restricts
the power of courts to issue injunctions or restraining orders during labor disputes.
See LAWRENCE A. SULLIvAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ANTITRUST § 237, at 723
(1977). Unfortunately for labor interests, however, the Supreme Court construed Sec-
tion 20 narrowly in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, when the Court upheld an
injunction against a secondary boycott similar to the one in Loewe. 254 U.S. 443
(1921). The Court interpreted the phrase, "in any case between an employer and em-
ployees... or growing out of a dispute concerning terms and conditions of employ-
ment" to apply solely to actions taken by employees against their immediate employ-
ers. Id. at 470.
The Norris-Laguardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1992), was passed in 1932 to ex-
pressly overrule Duplex. See U.S. v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941). "[Tlhe al-
lowable area of union activity was not to be restricted, as it had been in the Duplex
case, to an immediate employer-employee relation[ship]." Id.; see also Barry S. Rob-
erts & Brian A. Powers, Defining the Relationship Between Antitrust Law and Labor
Law: Professional Sports and the Current Legal Battleground, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV.
395, 420-21 (1978).
The Act also expands the phrase "labor dispute" to include tactics such as secon-
dary boycotts and picketing. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1992). Further, the Act denies courts the
power to issue injunctions in labor disputes based solely on the grounds that the par-
ties "are engaged in an unlawful combination or conspiracy." Id. § 105. Justice
Goldberg's separate opinion in Jewel Tea stated that the Norris-Laguardia Act was
more than merely relief from injunctions. Local 189 Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.
Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 703-04 (1965). Its purpose was to reaffirm the goals of
the Clayton Act and "'withdraw federal courts from a type of controversy for which
many believed they were ill-suited and from participation in which, it was feared,
judicial prestige might suffer.'" Id. at 704 (quoting Marine Cooks and Stewards v.
Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 370 n.7 (1960)).
The protection of labor activities is far-reaching. See Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 233-
37 (giving broad reading to § 20 of Clayton Act to immunize unions from criminal
antitrust liability).
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-
labor groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20 are not to be distinguished by
[Vol. 67:593
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and the union on mandatory subjects of collective bargaining."13
The term "mandatory subjects" has been defined by statute to in-
clude "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment." 14 Restrictions on player mobility clearly fall within this
classification; 5 therefore, sports leagues have used this definition
to defend their restrictive practices as exempt from antitrust
inquiry. 6
2. Per Se Violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the
Modern Approach to the Rule of Reason
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 189017 provides for broad con-
demnation of anticompetitive agreements restraining interstate
commerce.' 8 The Supreme Court, however, has recognized that all
agreements can be said to restrain trade in some manner, and has
any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrong-
ness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular
union activities are the means.
Id. at 232 (footnote omitted); see Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 501-03
(1940) (holding that statutory exemption reaches collective activities which are inher-
ently anticompetitive).
Unions, by their very nature, are groups of people acting together in restraint of
free competition and trade. See UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 666 (1965). The
Supreme Court "has recognized that a legitimate aim of any national labor organiza-
tion is to obtain uniformity of labor standards and that a consequence of such union
activity may be to eliminate competition based on differences in such standards." Id.;
see also Archibald Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104
U. PA. L. REv. 252, 254 (1955); Michael S. Jacobs & Ralph K._ Winter, Antitrust Princi-
ples and Collective Bargaining By Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1,
21 n.47 (1971). "A union is a horizontal agreement between competitors to fix the
prices (wages) at which they will work" Id.
13 CHAMPION, supra note 3, § 26.2, at 460; cf. Philip J. Closius, Professional Sports
and Antitrust Law: The Ground Rules of Immunity, Exemption, and Liability, in Gov-
ERNMENT AND SPORT: THE PuBuc PoUcy IssuEs 143 (Arthur T. Johnson & James H.
Frey eds., 1985) (noting that not all good-faith provisions secured by unions will be
exempt from antitrust laws).
14 National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1992). The term
"mandatory subjects" was borrowed by the Court from the statute. See id.
15 Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801
(1977).
16 See, e.g., McCourt 460 F. Supp. at 910; Mackey, 407 F. Supp. at 1003; Robert-
son v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867, 881-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kapp, 390 F. Supp. at 84.
This is a unique application of the nonstatutory labor exemption. Ordinarily, an
employer will use the exemption as a defense to a suit brought by a third party
harmed by an alleged anticompetitive practice incorporated in a CBA. Gary R. Rob-
erts, McNeil Opened NFL Antitrust Door, NATL L.J., Feb. 22, 1993, at 26.
17 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1992).
18 Id. § 1. "Every contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States... is declared to be illegal." Id.
1993]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:593
therefore rejected a literal interpretation of the statute.19 Accord-
ingly, the Court has adopted a "Rule of Reason" approach and has
held that the Act prohibits only "unreasonable restraints" on
trade.20 Whether a challenged restraint will be deemed "unrea-
sonable" depends on a broad inquiry into the restraint's effect on
competition, balancing the anticompetitive effects of the restraint
with any procompetitive effects.21 This broad inquiry has had its
difficulties.22 For example, in order to prove that a given restraint
is unreasonable, a plaintiff must present extensive data and ex-
pert testimony.23 As a partial solution to this problem, the Court
has concluded that certain practices are so unreasonable and an-
ticompetitive that they are illegal per se.2 4 Although there are sev-
eral acts which fall within this category,25 the Court has recently
demonstrated unwillingness to expand this area.26
19 See Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). Apply-
ing the Sherman Act literally would destroy the free market system. Gary R. Roberts,
Federal Labor and Antitrust Policy: The Special Case of Sports League Labor Re-
straints, 75 GEO. L.J. 19, 29 n.40 (1986); Closius, supra note 13, at 154.
20 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-62 (1911); Roberts, supra
note 16, at 26.
21 Chicago Board of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238. "The true test of legality is whether
the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes com-
petition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition." Id.; see
also Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (noting Rule of
Reason was judicially established).
22 See Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitu-
tional Sherman Act, 74 CAL. L. REv. 266, 268 (1986) (suggesting "constitution-like
vagueness" and indeterminacy which plagues antitrust inquiries); see also Gellhorn &
Tatham, supra note 11 (providing guidelines on when to apply per se rule or Rule of
Reason standards).
23 JoHN C. WEIsTART & CYN LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.07, at 593 (1979).
24 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1956). The Court stated that
"there are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unrea-
sonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they
have caused or the business excuse for their use." Id. (emphasis added). Hence, the
per se illegal category was created. Id.
25 See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U.S. 97, 102-03 (1980) (vertical price fixing); United States v. Topco Ass'n, 405 U.S.
596, 609-11 (1972) (horizontal market allocation); Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (group boycotts and concerted refusals to deal where
intent is to restrain competition).
26 Topco Ass'n, 405 U.S. at 607-08. "It is only after considerable experience with
certain business relationships that courts classify them as per se violations of the
Sherman Act." Id. Furthermore, a mechanical application of the per se rule, even
when applicable, is frowned upon:
[E]asy labels do not always supply ready answers .... Literalness is overly
simplistic and often overbroad .... [Ilt is necessary to characterize the chal-
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For instance, in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma,27 the Supreme Court considered a plan in which the
NCAA attempted to minimize the adverse effect of live television
upon game attendance by limiting each member school's television
exposure and financial compensation as well as the total amount
of televised college football games. 28 Both lower courts found that
the NCAA restrictions constituted per se violations of the Sher-
man Act.2" Although setting prices and restraining output are or-
dinarily illegal per se,30 the Supreme Court disagreed, and instead
applied a Rule of Reason test because the "case involve[d] an in-
dustry in which horizontal restraints on competition [were] essen-
tial if the product [was] to be available at all."3 - The Court never-
theless held that even under the Rule of Reason standard, the
anticompetitive effects of the restriction outweighed any possible
procompetitive effects, and the restraint could not stand.2
lenged conduct as falling within or without that category of behavior to
which we apply the label "per se price fixing." That will often, but not al-
ways, be a simple matter.
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1979) (footnote
omitted); see also id. at 13 n.24.
27 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
28 Id. at 91-94. The controversy arose when two NCAA schools, both members of a
sub-association within the NCAA, contracted with a different network to televise
games. Id. at 94-95. The NCAA threatened disciplinary action against any school per-
forming the contract. Id. at 95. The schools brought suit to enjoin such actions. Id.
29 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1304-11 (W.D. Okla. 1982), modified, 707 F.2d 1147, 1153-
56 (10th Cir. 1983).
30 468 U.S. at 100. "Horizontal price-fixing and output limitation are ordinarily
condemned as a matter of law under an 'illegal per se' approach because the
probability that these practices are anticompetitive is so high .... " Id.
31 Id. at 101.
32 Id. at 104-20. It has been noted that the NCAA espouses a policy that the per
se approach will not be used "in the evaluation of cooperative sports regulations."
WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 23 (Supp. 1985), § 5.10, at 120; see also Gary R.
Roberts, The Evolving Confusion of Professional Sports Antitrust, the Rule of Reason,
and the Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 945, 948 n.8 (1988). The
circuit courts prior and subsequent to this case have followed this policy. See, e.g., Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1392 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); North Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1258-59
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982); Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d
1173, 1177-82 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606,620 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
19931
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B. Application to Professional Sports
1. Baseball's Exemption
The Supreme Court addressed the application of antitrust law
to baseball3 3 in the landmark case of Federal Baseball Club of Bal-
timore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs.34
In its complaint, the Federal Baseball Club alleged that the de-
fendant-leagues conspired to monopolize the baseball business by
purchasing some of the plaintiffs fellow member league clubs and
inducing others to leave.35 The Court, finding for the defendants,
held that baseball did not constitute interstate commerce and
therefore was not subject to federal antitrust law. 6
After several legal attacks on Federal Baseball, the Court
was presented with another antitrust challenge to baseball in
Toolson v. New York Yankees.38 Toolson was a consolidation of
cases challenging major league baseball's reserve system, 39 which
allowed a team to retain perpetual rights over its players. 40 Es-
33 American League Baseball Club v. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1914), was the
first case to examine baseball and antitrust. The court was asked to specifically en-
force a contract between a player and an owner after the player signed a contract with
a team in another league. Id. at 7-8. Although the player's services were unique and a
proper substitute was not available, id. at 8, the court refused to issue the injunction
due to lack of mutuality. Id. at 14. The court also addressed the antitrust issue, but
found that organized baseball was not interstate commerce subject to control by Con-
gress. Id. at 16-17. In dicta, however, it was noted that organized baseball was an
"illegal combination." Id. at 17.
34 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
35 Id. at 207. The plaintiff was the sole remaining member of the Federal League,
a competitor of the National and American Leagues. Id.
36 Id. at 208-09. Justice Holmes wrote:
The business is giving exhibitions of base ball, which are purely state
affairs. It is true that... competitions must be arranged between clubs from
different cities and States. But... the transport is a mere incident, not the
essential thing. That to which it is incident... would not be called trade or
commerce in the commonly accepted use of those words .... [Plersonal
effort, not related to production, is not a subject of commerce.
Id.
37 See Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 408-11 (2d Cir. 1949) (reasoning of
Federal Baseball severely weakened by Supreme Court); see also John W. Neville,
Baseball and the Antitrust Laws, 16 FoRDHAM L. REv. 208, 214-15 (1947) (expanding
definition of commerce makes holding less viable); Comment, Monopsony in Man-
power: Organized Baseball Meets the Antitrust Laws, 62 YALE L.J. 576, 608-11 (1952)
(organized baseball is interstate commerce).
38 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam).
39 Kowalski v. Chandler, 202 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1953), and Corbett v. Chandler,
202 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1953), were the other cases.
40 See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 23, § 3.12, at 283; see also Flood v. Kuhn,
407 U.S. 258, 289 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (player bound to club for entire
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sentially, a player who is unhappy with his position has two op-




Furthermore, the team is free to trade or release the player with-
out his consent regardless of whether he is satisfied with his
position.42
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the
lower courts' dismissals of the complaints by noting that Congress
had, by its silence, acquiesced to the ruling in Federal Baseball.43
A vigorous dissent, however, argued that organized baseball had
become involved in interstate activity to a degree sufficient to trig-
ger application of the Sherman Act.44
Toolson was subsequently applied by lower courts,45 but not
without reservation. 46 In 1972, the Court confronted another chal-
lenge to baseball's reserve system in Flood v. Kuhn,4" which
stands as the last high court ruling on baseball's antitrust exemp-
tion. Curt Flood, an all-star centerfielder for the St. Louis
Cardinals, was traded to the Philadelphia Phillies without con-
professional career); In re The Twelve Clubs Comprising Nat'l League of Professional
Baseball Clubs and The Twelve Clubs Comprising Am. League of Professional Base-
ball Clubs, 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 101, 103-04 (1975) (Seitz, Arb.) [hereinafter Messer-
smith Arbitration] (defining and explaining function of reserve system).
41 See CHaiPIoN, supra note 3, § 25.4, at 447.
42 Id.; Flood, 407 U.S. at 289 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
43 Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357. "Congress has had the ruling under consideration but
has not seen fit to bring such business under these laws .... The business has thus
been left for thirty years to develop, on the understanding that it was not subject to
existing antitrust litigation." Id.
44 Id. at 357-65 (Burton, J., dissenting). The Court's opinion would be nothing
more than an ordinary application of stare decisis were it not for one important factor:
in the thirty-one years between Federal Baseball and Toolson, the very definition of
interstate commerce had been dramatically altered. See, e.g., United States v. Na-
tional Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, 490-92 (1950) (extending classifica-
tion of commerce to include personal services for purposes of Sherman Act).
45 See, e.g., State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 31 Wis. 2d 699 (1966) (holding that
state antitrust laws were no longer applicable to baseball), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 990
(1966).
46 Salerno v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub nom. Salerno v. Kuhn, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971). Judge
Friendly "freely acknowledge[d] ... that Federal Baseball was not one of Mr. Justice
Holmes' happiest days [and] that the rationale of Toolson [was] extremely dubious."
Id. at 1005. While he felt bound to apply those cases, he stated that the members of
his court would not "fall out of their chairs with surprise at the news that Federal
Baseball and Toolson had been overruled .... ." Id.
47 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
1993]
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sent or notice. 48 He refused to report to the Phillies and brought
suit.
49
Unlike the Toolson Court, the Court in Flood relied upon
more than "mere congressional silence and passivity."50 The Court
found it significant that over fifty bills regarding baseball's anti-
trust exemption had been introduced since Toolson, and not one
had passed both houses of Congress.5 1 Although it was recognized
that reaffirming an antitrust exemption for baseball seemed to
contradict the Court's handling of other sports,52 fifty years of pre-
cedent proved too much for Mr. Flood to overcome, and the exemp-
tion stood. 3 A stern dissent criticized the majority for its rigid
application of stare decisis54 and argued that the apparent inter-
state nature of baseball should subject it to federal antitrust
law. 55
Since the Flood decision, legislative bills to remove the ex-
emption have been introduced in Congress, but have gained little
48 Id. at 264-65.
49 Id. at 265.
50 Id. at 283. Congress had "by its positive inaction.., clearly evinced a desire
not to disapprove [this grant of immunity] legislatively." Id. at 283-84.
51 Id. at 281; see also id. at 281 n.17 (itemizing various bills considered by Con-
gress on baseball's exemption).
52 Flood, 407 U.S. at 282-83. Justice Blackmun noted:
With its reserve system enjoying exemption from the federal antitrust laws,
baseball is, in a very distinct sense, an exception and an anomaly. Federal
Baseball and Toolson have become an aberration confined to baseball ....
Other professional sports operating interstate-football, boxing, basketball,
and, presumably, hockey and golf-are not so exempt.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
53 Id. at 282.
It is an aberration that has been with us now for half a century, one hereto-
fore deemed fully entitled to the benefit of stare decisis, and one that has
survived the Court's expanding concept of interstate commerce. It rests on a
recognition and an acceptance of baseball's unique characteristics and
needs.
Id.
54 Id. at 292-93 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 286-87 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also John R. Allison, Professional
Sports and the Antitrust Laws: Status of the Reserve System, 25 BAYLOR L. Rav. 1
(1973); Jacobs & Winter, supra note 12; Arthur J. Keeffe, The Flood Case at Ebbtide,
59 A.B.A. J. 91 (1973); John P. Morris, In the Wake of the Flood, 38 Lw & CoNTrMEP.
PROBs. 85 (1973) (commenting on Flood case).
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support.5 6 The success of baseball players in collective bargaining
has been cited as a reason for such legislative inaction."
2. Applicability to Other Sports
It is significant to note that baseball was the only sport
played on a national level at the time of Federal Baseball.5 8 Con-
flicts arising out of other sports did not reach the courts until the
definition of interstate commerce was broadened by New Deal
case law,59 which expansion created a wider scope for potential
antitrust violations.6 °
For example, in Radovich v. NFL,61 the Supreme Court held
that football was subject to antitrust law.62 The Court explicitly
limited the antitrust exemption to baseball based on the Toolson
rationale of congressional acquiescence.63 The discriminatory
treatment of football as compared with baseball troubled some
members of the Court, who in turn suggested the need for a legis-
lative response to remedy such incongruous results.64 With little
hope of a judicial or legislative exemption from antitrust law, the
56 See PAUL D. STAUDOHAR, THE SPORTS INDUSTRY AND CoLLECIVE BARGAING
21 (1989) (noting 1977 and 1988 proposals to strip baseball of its exemption); see also
Robert G. Berger, After the Strikes: A Reexamination of Professional Baseball's Ex-
emption from the Antitrust Laws, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 209 (1983) (calling on Congress
to remove exemption).
57 See STAUDOHAR, supra note 56, at 21.
58 See 1 ROBERT C. BERRY & GLENN M. WONG, LAw AND BusINEss OF THE SPORTS
INDUSTRIEs § 2.23, at 97-98 (1986); ROBERT C. BERRY, ET AL., Labor Relations in Pro-
fessional Sports 30 (1986).
69 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (abolishing distinctions
between production, consumption, and marketing for purposes of commerce power
regulation); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (holding intra-
state activities having substantial relation to interstate commerce subject to federal
legislation); see also United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S.
485, 490-92 (1950) (extending classification of commerce to include personal services
for purposes of Sherman Act).
60 NLRB, 301 U.S. at 31; BERRY & WONG, supra note 58, § 2.23, at 98.
61 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
62 Id. at 452. Radovich left the NFL while under contract with a member club
and played two seasons in a rival league before attempting to join an NFL affiliate
who was not in competition with the league. Id. at 448. The NFL "black-listed" him
by threatening to discipline any affiliated club which signed him. Id. By this time, the
competing league had folded. Id. at 448 n.4.
63 Id. at 451. "As long as the Congress continues to acquiesce we should adhere
to-but not extend-the interpretation of the [Sherman] Act made in those cases." Id.
64 Id. at 456 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
I am unable to distinguish football from baseball under the rationale of Fed-
eral Baseball and Toolson .... I think it far better to leave it to be dealt
with by Congress than for this Court to becloud the situation further, either
1993]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:593
NFL has since sought to avoid antitrust liability on other
grounds.6 5
Coincidental to the Radovich decision, two lower courts held
that basketball was not immune from antitrust law.66 Thus, even
though the Supreme Court has not ruled on the subject, basket-
ball is also deemed to be subject to federal antitrust law.
Similarly, there is no high court ruling with respect to
hockey. 68 In 1972, a series of district court cases applied the Sher-
man Act to challenges of hockey's reserve system.69 Soon thereaf-
by making untenable distinctions between baseball and other professional
sports or by discriminatory fiat in favor of baseball.
Id.
65 See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text (explaining nonstatutory labor
exemption defense).
The NFL has also tried to avoid antitrust liability by use of the "single entity"
theory. The league argues that it is really a joint venture with the member clubs as
joint venturers. See Closius, supra note 13, at 150. Thus, according to the NFL, it
should be immune from antitrust liability, "since, as a single entity, it cannot con-
tract, conspire, or combine with itself." Id. This defense has been rejected by at least
two federal circuit courts of appeals. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v.
NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1387-90 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); North Am.
Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1256-58 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074
(1982).
The commentary on this defense is divided. See Myron C. Grauer, Recognition of
the National Football League as a Single Entity Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act:
Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1, 2-6 (1983); Gary R.
Roberts, The Antitrust Status of Sports Leagues Revisited, 64 TuL. L. REv. 117, 119-20
(1989); John C. Weistart, League Control of Market Opportunities: A Perspective on
Competition and Cooperation in the Sports Industry, 1984 DuKE L.J. 1013, 1044-64
(1984) (arguing in support of single-entity defense). But see Lee Goldman, Sports, An-
titrust, and the Single-Entity Theory, 63 TuL. L. REv. 751, 761-89 (1989); Michael S.
Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single Entity Theory: A De-
fense of the Status Quo, 67 IND. L.J. 25, 43-46 (1991) (arguing against use of single-
entity defense).
66 See Washington Professional Basketball Corp. v. NBA, 147 F. Supp. 154, 155
(S.D.N.Y. 1956); cf. Central N.Y. Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett, 181 N.E.2d 506, 517
(Ohio 1961) (approving restriction on player mobility under Rule of Reason).
67 See, e.g., Flood, 407 U.S. at 283 (discussing anomaly of baseball's antitrust ex-
emption); Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205-06 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1971)
(reinstating preliminary injunction issued against NBA "Four Year Rule"); Robertson
v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
68 See Flood, 407 U.S. at 283 (stating baseball's exemption is unique and
"presuming" hockey is not exempt).
69 See, e.g., Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261, 266
(D. Mass. 1972); Nassau Sports, Inc. v. Hampton, 355 F. Supp. 733, 735 (D. Minn.
1972). The most important of these cases was Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v.
Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972), where Judge Hig-
ginbotham held that "hockey is not exempt from the federal anti-trust law .... "Id. at
466 n.3.
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ter, in McCourt v. California Sports, Inc.,70 the Sixth Circuit fol-
lowed suit.71 Thus, it appears that hockey is indeed subject to
antitrust laws.
II. PLAYER REsTRAINTs
A. The Reserve System and Option Clauses
A reserve system is used by team owners to bind a player to a
particular team in perpetuity.72 It is this eternal nature of a re-
serve system that makes it so onerous. 73 Typically, a player's con-
tract will contain a clause providing for a one-year unilateral re-
newal by the club if no agreement is reached on a new contract. 74
The renewal clause carries forward into each new contract and
can theoretically be exercised indefinitely by the team.75 In con-
trast are "pure option clauses," which restrict the team's renewal
right to one year.76 Football is the only sport which expressly pro-
vides for these pure option clauses.77 Some state courts, however,
have held that this limitation is also implied in basketball
contracts.7 8
1. Baseball
Attacks on baseball's reserve system date back to the 19th
century.79 The Supreme Court, however, has continually upheld
70 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
71 See id. at 1197-98 (applying nonstatutory labor exemption from antitrust
laws).
72 Flood, 407 U.S. at 289 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see supra notes 40-42 and
accompanying text (discussion of reserve system).
73 Flood, 407 U.S. at 289.
74 See, e.g., Baseball Contract § 10(a) (quoted in WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note
23, § 5.03, at 501). "If... the Player and the Club have not agreed upon the terms of
such contract, then... the Club shall have the right... to renew this contract for a
period of one year on the same terms." Id. (emphasis added).
75 Id.
76 WEiSTART & LOWELL, supra note 23, § 5.03, at 502.
77 See, e.g., Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73, 77 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (referring to para-
graph 10 of Standard Player Contract containing option clause), affd, 586 F.2d 644
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979).
78 See Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240, 243 (1969); Central N.Y. Basket-
ball, Inc. v. Barnett, 181 N.E.2d 506, 507 (Ohio 1961). In Robertson v. NBA, 389 F.
Supp. 867, 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the players contended that this option was actually
perpetual in operation.
79 See, e.g., Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, 42 F. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1890) (de-
nying club remedy in action against player refusing to negotiate reserve contract);
Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 9 N.Y.S. 779 (Sup. Ct. 1890) (contract not suffi-
ciently definite to restrain player from contracting with other teams). In Toolson v.
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baseball's exemption from the antitrust laws, an exemption which
simultaneously protected baseball's reserve system. 0 As recently
as 1972, in Flood v. Kuhn,81 the Court denied a challenge to the
reserve system as an antitrust violation. 82 The Court, however,
did warn the owners to resolve their differences with the players
by negotiation before Congress intervened. 3
In 1968, several years before Flood, an agreement was
reached between the players and owners to resolve future dis-
putes over collective bargaining by arbitration. 4 Originally, the
Commissioner was the arbitrator.8 5 Beginning in 1970, independ-
ent arbitrators were used.86 Surprisingly, this seemingly minor
concession by the owners led to the overthrow of baseball's perpet-
ual reserve system,8 7 beginning with the Messersmith Arbitra-
tion."" The key issue in Messersmith was the duration of the club's
right to renew the players' contracts: the players argued that they
were free agents after the team initially exercised their right of
renewal to keep the player for one additional year; the owners ar-
gued that their right of renewal was perpetual.8 9 The arbitrator
agreed with the players, granting them free agency,90 and in so
New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam), the Supreme Court dismissed
plaintiffs challenge to the reserve system, without even considering its merits, by
applying baseball's antitrust exemption. Id.
80 See supra notes 33-57 and accompanying text (development of baseball's
exemption).
81 407 U.S. 258 (1972); see supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (detailing
facts of Flood case). In addition to alleging antitrust violations, Flood claimed that
the reserve system was a method of involuntary servitude that violated the Thir-
teenth Amendment. 407 U.S. at 265-66.
82 407 U.S. at 285.
83 Id. at 286 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
84 Telephone interview with Eugene Orza, Associate General Counsel, Major
League Baseball Players Association, in New York, N.Y. (July 23, 1993).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 See infra notes 88-98 (detailing end of baseball's perpetual reserve system). It
should be noted that there was no call to abolish the reserve system. Messersmith
Arbitration, 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 101, 112 (1975) (Seitz, Arb.). In fact, the players con-
ceded that some form of it was necessary for the proper operation of the league. See
Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 275-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir.
1971), affd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
88 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 101 (1975) (Seitz, Arb.). In the Messersmith Arbitration,
two players, Andy Messersmith and Dave McNally, had their contracts automatically
renewed by their clubs as authorized in § 10(a) of their contracts. Id.; see supra note
74 (quoting § 10(a) of Baseball Contract).
89 Messersmith Arbitration, 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 112-13.
90 Id. at 118.
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doing, overcame language in the Major League Rules which ap-
peared to support the owners' position.91 The decision, however,
was binding only upon the players who had brought the
challenge.92
Although an adverse judicial decision would establish a bind-
ing precedent on the league with respect to all players, the league
opted for judicial review of the arbitrator's decision.93 In Kansas
City Royals Baseball Corp. v. MLB Players Ass'n,9 a the owners
presented evidence that the perpetual nature of the reserve sys-
tem had always been presumed.9 5 The district court, however, re-
lied solely on evidence existing subsequent to the collective bar-
The grievances of Messersmith and McNally are sustained. There is no
contractual bond between these players and the Los Angeles and the Mon-
treal clubs, respectively. Absent such a contract, their clubs had no right or
power, under the Basic Agreement, the Uniform Player Contract or the Ma-
jor League Rules to reserve their services for their exclusive use for any
period beyond the "renewal year" in the contracts which these players had
theretofore signed with their clubs.
Id.
Arbitrator Seitz was troubled by what he perceived to be an unclear intent in
§ 10(a) to bind the player in perpetuity. Id. at 113.
91 See id. at 111. Arbitrator Seitz also had to overcome Major League Rule 4(a)
which required that each team provide the Commissioner and League President with
[A] list of not exceeding forty... active and eligible players, whom the club
desires to reserve for the ensuing season... and thereafter no player on any
list shall be eligible to play for or negotiate with any other club until his
contract has been assigned or he has been released.
Id. (quoting Rule 4(a)).
The leagues also argued that even if the teams were limited by § 10(a) of the
Baseball Contract to one renewal, the language of Rule 4(a) gave them the exclusive
right of negotiation for all reserved players. Id. at 111 n.23. Arbitrator Seitz ruled
that a contract was a condition precedent to placing a player on the reserved list;
since all contractual ties were terminated at the end of the option year, the reserva-
tion of these players had no legal effect. Id. at 116-17.
92 WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 23, § 5.07, at 593.
93 Id. § 4.05, at 354.
94 409 F. Supp. 233 (W.D. Mo.), affd, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976). The owners
originally brought suit to enjoin the arbitration. Id. at 236. By stipulation, it was
agreed that the arbitration would be completed before judicial proceedings com-
menced. Id.
95 Kansas City Royals, 532 F.2d at 630-31. The leagues hoped to establish that a
perpetual reserve system was a matter of usage in the baseball industry. WEISTART &
LOWELL, supra note 23, § 5.03, at 519. Under the general rule that ambiguous con-
tract terms are read in light of the surrounding facts and circumstances, including
custom and usage, the existence of a perpetual reserve system could have been read
into the contract. See ARTHUR CoamN, CoRam ON CoiNTRcTs §§ 544-45, 556-58
(1951); see, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 275-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 443
F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), affd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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gaining relationship in the sport,96 which showed only that the
parties had never reached agreement on the definition of the
reserve system.97 In such a situation, the arbitrator is given broad
deference when interpreting an ambiguous term in a contract;
therefore, the arbitrator's decision in Messersmith went
undisturbed.98
The rules regarding free agency have since been incorporated
into the Major League Agreement between the players, owners,
and leagues. 99 A player whose contract has expired and who has
performed six years of major league service is eligible to become a
free agent.100 Players whose contracts have expired and who have
96 Kansas City Royals, 409 F. Supp. at 243. The court summarily dismissed any
evidence which preceded the collective bargaining relationship. Id. Judge Oliver
observed:
[Tihe history of how club owners may have run their business in the 19th
Century and that portion of the 20th Century before they entered into a col-
lective bargaining agreement with a recognized labor organization repre-
senting its employees simply is not relevant or material to the determination
of the legal questions presented in this case.
Id.
97 Id. at 246; see also Kansas City Royals, 532 F.2d at 631 (recognizing disparities
between each party's definition of reserve system).
98 WEIsTART & LOWELL, supra note 23, § 5.07, at 593. This principle is especially
evident in labor arbitration, where awards will not be set aside on judicial review
without a showing of "clear infidelity" to the agreement by the arbitrator. See United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568-69 (1960) (strong deference to
arbitrator's decisions); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 585 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 597 (1960) (court may refuse enforcement of arbitrator's decision on showing that
arbitrator demonstrated infidelity to language of agreement).
99 BAsic AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE AMERIcAN LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL BASE-
BALL CLUBS AND THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS AND MA-
JOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, Jan. 1, 1990, at art. XK, § B, reprinted
in LAw OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, at 5-63 (Gary Uberstine ed. 1990)
[hereinafter 1990 MLB AGREEMENT].
100 Id. § B(1), at 5-63.
There are additional procedural requirements which must be satisfied. First, the
player must file his intent to become a free agent within the fifteen day period begin-
ning on October 15 or the day after the last World Series game, whichever is later. Id.
§ B(2)(a), at 5-63. Second, he must inform the Player Relations Committee of his in-
tentions, a requirement typically fulfilled on his behalf by the Players Association.
Id.; Telephone interview with Eugene Orza, supra note 84. Once these two conditions
are fulfilled, the player is free to negotiate with any team upon expiration of the fif-
teen day period. 1990 MLB AGREEMENT, supra note 99, art. XX, § B(2), reprinted in
LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 99, at 5-63.
The former team has a right to re-sign the player. Id. § B(3), at 5-64. The team
must offer the player salary arbitration before December 7th. Id. If the player accepts
the offer by December 19th, he is bound to his former team for another year at a
salary to be determined through the normal salary arbitration process. Id. If the offer
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not completed six years of service, however, can only negotiate
with their original clubs.' 0 ' If there is no agreement on salary, the
matter is submitted to binding arbitration to determine the
player's salary for the following year. 0 2 Furthermore, many play-
ers who become free agents and sign with other clubs cannot be-
come free agents again until they complete an additional five
years of major league service.10 3
2. Hockey
Hockey had a perpetual reserve system which operated simi-
larly to baseball's until 1972104 when the World Hockey Associa-
tion (WHA)'0 5 attempted to enjoin its operation.10 6 In Philadel-
phia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc. ,107
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
is not accepted, then the team's right to negotiate expires on January 8th and is not
reactivated until May 1st. Id. at 5-64 to -65. Likewise, if an offer to arbitrate is not
made by December 7th, all negotiating rights are lost until May 1st. Id. at 5-64.
Players generally spend some time in the minor leagues, so the six years preced-
ing free agent eligibility in the major leagues may actually be more like ten years as a
professional baseball player. See Robert C. Berry, Collective Bargaining in Profes-
sional Sports, in LAw OF PROFESSioNAL AND AnATEUR SPORTS, supra note 99,
§ 4.02[3], at 4-12.
101 See 1990 MLB AGRfmmm, supra note 99, art. XX, § B(1), reprinted in LAw OF
PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 99, at 5-63. "[Elach club may have
title to and reserve up to 40 Player contracts. A club shall retain title to a contract and
reservation rights until... the Player becomes a free agent, as set forth in this agree-
ment. . . ." Id.
102 Id. at art. VI, § F(1), at 5-35.
103 Id. at art. XX, § D(1), at 5-68. Unranked free agents, infra note 139, are not
subject to this rule. Telephone interview with Eugene Orza, supra note 84.
104 Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351
F. Supp. 462, 480-85 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (describing history of NHL reserve system). The
renewal option has historically been interpreted as perpetual. Id. at 480. But see
Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240, 243 (1969); Central N.Y. Basketball, Inc. v.
Barnett, 181 N.E.2d 506, 507 (Ohio 1961) (holding similar language in NBA player
contract amounted to one-year option).
105 351 F. Supp. at 466. The WHA was a newly formed league which sought in-
stant credibility and future viability by signing some established NHL players, most
notably, superstar Bobby Hull of the Chicago Black Hawks. Id. at 492. In attempting
to sign these players, the WHA encouraged them to disregard the reserve clauses of
their contracts. Id.
106 Id. at 493. Specifically, the WHA charge was two-fold: first, the reserve sys-
tem was an illegal restraint of trade; and second, the NIL had monopolized the sup-
ply of hockey players. Id. at 493, 503-05; see also Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 §§ 1-
2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1992) (forbidding monopoly of interstate trade).
107 351 F. Supp. at 462.
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sylvania issued a preliminary injunction'0s against further use of
the reserve system,"0 9 noting, however, that some restraints were
necessary for the NHL to operate efficiently.110
The NHL reached a settlement with the WHA by instituting a
right of renewal device to replace the reserve system.'1 ' This pro-
cedure, which can be found in every player's contract," 2 allows
either the club or the player to bind the other party for one year
after the contract has expired."13 If the club does not exercise this
option, the player may elect to become a free agent."14 If, however,
either party does exercise its right of renewal, the player becomes
a free agent at the end of the additional year." 5
3. Basketball
Basketball's reserve system was challenged in Robertson v.
NBA." 6 The league defended the system on the grounds that it
really only provided for a one-year option,1 17 making the player a
108 Id. at 519. The basis of the injunction was premised on the second charge
rather than the first. Id. at 504.
109 Id. at 519. Judge Higginbotham ruled:
[Ilt is hereby ordered that the National Hockey League, its member clubs
and teams, ... are preliminarily enjoined from further prosecuting, com-
mencing, or threatening to commence any legal proceeding pursuant to and/
or to enforce the so-called "reserve clause".. . of the National Hockey League
Standard Player's Contract, against any player, coach or other person whose
contract, but for the reserve clause, expired on or before November 8, 1972.
Id.
110 Id. at 486, 504; see also Note, The Super Bowl and the Sherman Act: Profes-
sional Team Sports and the Antitrust Laws, 81 HARv. L. REv. 418,422 (1967) (describ-
ing rationale and advantages of reserve system).
111 WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 23, § 5.03, at 515.
112 NHL STmAD PLAYER CONTRACT 9118 (on file with ST. JoN's LAw Rxvmw).
113 Id. In order to exercise this right the team has two alternatives. First, it may
offer a termination contract, which is a one year contract containing no future re-
newal options. NHL BY-LAw § 9A.11. If the player accepts, he becomes a free agent at
the end of the year. NHL STANDARD PLAYER CONTRACT, supra note 112, % 18(a). If the
player does not accept, he immediately becomes a free agent. Id. Second, the team
may offer another Standard Player Contract with a right to salary arbitration if an
agreement on salary cannot be reached. Id. 1 18(b), 18(d).
114 Id. 91 18(a), 18(b). If the player does not elect to become a free agent, he can
compel the team to provide an option contract with the same terms as the prior con-
tract, but without renewal rights. Id. 1 18(c). After the option season, the player be-
comes a free agent. Id.
115 See supra notes 113-14 (explaining procedure for becoming free agent).
116 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The complaint included challenges to the
collegiate draft and to free agent compensation. Id. at 874-75.
117 Id. at 891. This interpretation was also adopted by two state courts. See
Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240, 244 (1969); Central N.Y. Basketball, Inc. v.
Barnett, 181 N.E.2d 506, 509-10 (Ohio 1961).
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free agent after the year had expired." 8 Although the district
court did not pass judgment on this issue, it noted that even if the
league's interpretation was correct, other restraints used by the
league, such as a compensation system and the collegiate draft," 9
did violate the Sherman Act.' 20 The court also rejected the
league's assertion that the restraints were immune from antitrust
attack due to the nonstatutory labor exemption, as there was no
evidence of good faith negotiation between the NBA and its
players. 12 1
The parties entered negotiations and reached a settlement 22
which has since been incorporated into the new CBA.' 23 There is
no reserve system per se, but there are limits on the mobility of
potential free agents.' 24
4. Football
As noted earlier, football did not have a reserve system, but
rather operated under a pure option system, which limited a
team's renewal right to one year.' 25 In Kapp v. NFL, 2 6 the court
found that this option system was not "patently unreasonable,"
118 Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 891.
119 Id. at 891-92.
120 Id. at 890-93. Judge Carter observed that "[practically all of the ... league
restraints appear to be per se violative of the Sherman Act .... The player draft and
perpetual reserve system are readily susceptible to condemnation as group boycotts
based on the NBA's concerted refusal to deal with the players save through these
uniform restrictive practices." Id.
121 Id. at 895.
I must confess that it is difficult for me to conceive of any theory or set of
circumstances pursuant to which the college draft, blacklisting, boycotts,
and refusals to deal could be saved from Sherman Act condemnation, even if
defendants were able to prove at trial their highly dubious contention that
these restraints were adopted at the behest of the Players Association.
Id.; see also CLAmPoN, supra note 3, § 26.2, at 460 (noting requirements of nonstatu-
tory labor exemption).
122 Robertson v. NBA, 72 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (approving settlement of class
action), affd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977).
123 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL As-
SOCIATION AND THE NATIONAL BAsKETBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, Nov. 1, 1988, at art.
V, reprinted in LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEuR SPoRTs, supra note 99, at 7-43
[hereinafter 1988 NBA AGREEMENT].
1 Id. §§ 1-5, at 7-68 to -72; see infra notes 211-16 and accompanying text (detail-
ing limits posed by agreement).
N5 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
126 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), affd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979).
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but its validity was never actually determined. 2 7 Later, however,
in Mackey v. NFL,' 2' although the option system was termed an
"anticompetitive practice,"' 29 it was upheld by the court because of
its nonoppressive length.'l 0
B. Free Agent Compensation
Once a player has become a free agent and signs with another
team, his former team is usually entitled to compensation, which
may include draft picks, active players, or cash.' 3 ' In essence, a
"forced trade" occurs when the new team must give up valuable
consideration for signing a free agent. 3 2 The leagues view it as a
fair means of compensating for the loss of a player's services.'
33
Players, however, claim that it unfairly restricts their mobility
127 Id. at 82-83. 'Ihe option rule... gives the club an option for one additional
year of service at 90% of the contract salary unless otherwise agreed." Id. at 82. The
rules set forth by the NFL "leave the matters of duration and salary to free negotia-
tion between players and clubs." Id. at 82-83. The court concluded that this option
provision taken by itself "cannot be said to so extend the original term and salary as
to render it patently unreasonable." Id. The court found it unnecessary to determine
the validity of the option rule because in order to grant summary judgment there need
be one illegal constraint on trade. Id.
128 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), modified, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
129 Id. at 1008.
130 See Kapp, 390 F. Supp. at 82-83 (finding option clause reasonable because
duration left to negotiation).
131 See, e.g., 1990 MLB AGREEMENT, supra note 99, at art. XX, § B(4), reprinted in
LAw OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 99, at 5-65 to -66 (player's
former team receives compensation consisting of amateur draft choices); NHL BY-LAw
§ 9A (player's former team entitled amateur draft choices or final offer arbitration);
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NATIONAL FooTBALL LEAGUE
PLAYERS ASSOCIATION AND THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE MANAGEMENT CoUNcIL,
May 6, 1993, at art. XIX, §§ 2-3 [hereinafter 1993 NFL AGREEMENT] (restricted free
agent's former team entitled to amateur draft picks); see also McCourt v. California
Sports Inc., 460 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (under 1974 Standard Player's Con-
tract, free agent's former club entitled to combination of assignment of player con-
tracts, draft choices, and cash), vacated, 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979); Kapp, 390 F.
Supp. at 82 (discussing "Rozelle" rule requiring that player's former club be compen-
sated with active players).
132 WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 23, § 5.03, at 503.
133 See, e.g., NHL BY-LAw § 9A.7.
The purpose of the equalization payment shall be to compensate a player's
prior Member Club fairly for loss of the right to his services when that player
becomes a free agent and the right to his services is acquired by another
Member Club or a club owned or controlled by another Member Club.
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The current free agent compensation structure was estab-
lished after the 1985 strike.'3 5 Only future amateur draft choices
may be used as compensation. 136 This was carried over into the
1990 agreement with a caveat; a team must offer salary arbitra-
tion to the departing player in order to be entitled to compensa-
tion. 137 The departing player is classified into one of three groups
based on a complicated statistical formula which ranks the player
with others who play the same position. 13 The proper compensa-




Although traditionally an NFL player could become a free
agent at the end of his option year, his mobility would remain se-
verely restricted under a league-supervised system of free agent
compensation. 140 Under the Rozelle Rule, prior to the signing of a
134 See, e.g., McCourt, 460 F. Supp. at 907; Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000,
1006 (D. Minn. 1975), modified, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S.
801 (1977); Kapp, 390 F. Supp. at 78.
135 BERRY ET AL., supra note 58, at 267.
136 Telephone interview with Eugene Orza, supra note 84. From 1981 to 1985 free
agent compensation involved the selection of other major league players. Id. These
selections were made directly from the signing teams and indirectly from a pool of
unprotected players. Id.
137 1990 MILB AGREEMENT, supra note 99, at art. XX, § B(4)(c), reprinted in LAw
OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, at 5-65.
138 Jeffrey S. Moorad, Negotiating for the Professional Baseball Player, in LAw OF
PROFESSIONAL AND AATEuR SpoRTs, supra note 99, § 5.05[5][b], at 5-20 n.102.
139 1990 MLB AGREEMENT, supra note 99, at art. XX, § B(4), reprinted in LAw OF
PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, at 5-65 to -66.
Type A players rank in the upper 30% of their position. Id. Their departure is
compensated directly by the signing team's first round in the following year's amateur
draft. Id. In addition, a supplemental selection between the first and second rounds of
the draft is granted to the club. Id. Type B players rank in the upper 50% of their
position but not in the top 30%. Id. The former team gets a first round draft pick from
the signing team, with no supplemental pick. Id. Type C players rank in the top 60%
of their position but not in the upper 50%. Id. As compensation, the former team re-
ceives a supplemental pick between the second and third rounds of the draft. Id.
There is no compensation required for those who rank below 60%. Id.
140 CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS FOR THE NATIONAL FooTBALL LEAGUE, art.
12.1(H), reprinted in WEISTART & LOwELL, supra note 23, § 5.03, at 502-03 n.167. The
Rozelle Rule stated:
1993]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:593
free agent, the old and new clubs were required to negotiate "mu-
tually satisfactory arrangements" regarding the compensation to
be provided to the former; if this could not be accomplished, the
Commissioner had authority to make a final determination on the
issue. 14 1
The Rozelle Rule was first challenged in Kapp v. NFL,14 2 in
which the district court applied the Rule of Reason standard,
rather than the mechanical per se approach. 43 Using this
method, the court found that the Rozelle Rule as applied was un-
reasonable due to its scope and duration as well as the excessive
power given to the Commissioner. 44 The court also rejected the
NFL's claim that the nonstatutory labor exemption 145 protected
Any player, whose contract with a League club has expired, shall there-
upon become a free agent and shall no longer be considered a member of the
team of that club following the expiration date of such contract. Whenever a
player, becoming a free agent in such manner, thereafter signs a contract
with a different club in the League, then, unless mutually satisfactory ar-
rangements have been concluded between the two League clubs, the Com-
missioner may name and then award to the former club one or more players,
from the Active, Reserve, or Selection List (including future selection
choices) [i.e. draft picks] of the acquiring club as the Commissioner in his
sole discretion deems fair and equitable; any such decision by the Commis-
sioner shall be final and conclusive.
Id.
141 Id.
142 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), affd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979). Joe Kapp, a quarterback for the Minnesota Vikings,
played out his contract in 1969 and became a free agent when he refused to re-sign
with the Vikings. Id. at 76. Although other teams were interested in his services, no
offers were forthcoming. Id. He eventually signed with the New England Patriots,
who compensated the Vikings, but he was later forced to sit out when he refused to
sign a Standard Player Contract which would bind him to all league rules. Id. at 77.
143 Id. at 82. Judge Sweigert gave two reasons for his decision. First, he felt that
the unique nature of sports requires some restraints on player mobility in order to
promote competitive balance. Id. at 81. Second, the per se approach would prevent
collective bargaining on those restraints necessary for proper league operation. Id. at
81-82.
144 Id. at 82.
[A] rule imposing restraint virtually unlimited in time and extent, goes far
beyond any possible need for fair protection of the interest§ of the club-em-
ployers or the purposes of the NFL and.., imposes upon the player-employ-
ees such undue hardship as to be an unreasonable restraint .... Similarly,
the so-called "one-man rule", ... vesting final decision in the NFL Commis-
sioner, is also patently unreasonable,... insofar as that unilateral kind of
arbitration is used to interpret or enforce other NFL rules involving restric-
tions on the rights of players or clubs to free employment choice.
Id.
145 See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text (detailing nonstatutory labor
exemption).
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the Rule from antitrust scrutiny. 146 On appeal, this holding was
upheld. 147
Another group of players led a similar assault on the Rozelle
Rule in Mackey v. NFL.14 In that case the district court held that
the Rule and its related provisions' 49 were per se illegal 50 or al-
ternatively, invalid under the Rule of Reason.' As in Kapp, the
NFL raised the labor exemption as a defense, but it was sumna-
rily struck down.' 52
Although the basic holding of the trial court in Mackey was
upheld on appeal,15 3 the appellate court specifically rejected the
per se approach and adopted the Rule of Reason standard for
player restraints.15 4 In addition, the Mackey court set forth a
146 Kapp, 390 F. Supp. at 85-86. The NFL argued that the disputed restraints
were part of the Standard Player Contract, which was a subject of collective bargain-
mng. Id. at 78-79. As such, an individual employee had no grounds for complaint. Id. at
84. The court, however, held that even if the restraints were accepted by the players,
the CBA was not yet effective when the disputed restraints were enforced against the
players. Id. at 85-86. Therefore, the exemption could not be asserted. Id. In dictum,
the court hinted that the labor exemption, even where present, was not an automatic
insulator for all restrictions on an employee's right to freely seek work. Id. This is a
restatement of Justice Marshall's vigorous dissent in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258,
295-96 (1972).
147 Kapp, 586 F.2d at 650.
148 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), modified, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). While Kapp was on appeal, John Mackey, an all-
pro tight end for the Baltimore Colts, led a group of active and retired players seeking
injunctive relief from the Rozelle Rule as well as monetary damages. Id. at 1002.
149 Id. at 1005-06. These practices included the Standard Player Contract, the
option clause, the draft and the no tampering rule. Id.
150 Id. at 1007. According to the court, the restraints amounted to a group boycott
and a concerted refusal to deal, which have historically been condemned under the
per se approach. Id.; see also Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207,
212 (1959) (group boycotts and refusals to deal forbidden).
151 Mackey, 407 F. Supp. at 1007. Judge Larson gave three reasons for this con-
clusion. First, the Rule was too broad in its application, applying not only to the best
players as the target of restriction, but to marginal players as well. Id. Second, the
Rule lacked the most fundamental safeguards of due process. Id. Finally, the unlim-
ited duration of the Rule made it unreasonable. Id.
152 Id. at 1008-10. The court reasoned that the nonstatutory labor exemption
could not be applicable where an anticompetitive provision was unilaterally imposed
upon a weak union. Id. at 1010; see also Flood, 407 U.S. at 295-96 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (questioning use of exemption when union lacks strength to fight restriction).
Judge Larson also noted that the union remained too weak to fight any further appli-
cation of the Rozelle Rule. Mackey, 407 F. Supp. at 1010. Thus, the exemption was
unavailable. Id.
153 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 623.
154 Id. at 619. Chief Judge Lay explained:
[T]he NFL assumes some of the characteristics of ajoint venture in that each
member club has a stake in the success of the other teams .... Although
19931
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three-prong test for determining when the nonstatutory labor ex-
emption can be used: 1) the restraint primarily affects only the
parties to the CBA; 2) the agreement contains a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining; and 3) the agreement comes from bona fide,
arms-length negotiating.1 55 In Mackey, failure to satisfy the third
prong prevented the NFL from claiming the benefit of this
exemption. 156
Ironically, despite their success in court, the players soon bar-
gained away their victory157 in the 1977 and 1982 NFL Agree-
ments, which changed only the method of free agent compensa-
tion.' 58 Most notably, an objective compensation formula was
adopted, eliminating the need for the Commissioner to settle dis-
putes.15 9 In addition, the former team also had a right of first re-
fusal on any offer the player received from another team. 60
Otherwise, the Rozelle Rule was left undisturbed. 16 1
businessmen cannot wholly evade the antitrust laws by characterizing their
operation as a joint venture, we conclude that the unique nature of the busi-
ness of professional football renders it inappropriate to mechanically apply
per se illegality rules .... This is particularly true where, as here, the al-
leged restraint does not completely eliminate competition for players' serv-
ices .... In similar circumstances, when faced with a unique or novel busi-
ness situation, courts have eschewed a per se analysis in favor of an inquiry
into the reasonableness of the restraint under the circumstances.
Id. (second emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Furthermore, "[ilt may be that some reasonable restrictions relating to player
transfers are necessary for the successful operation of the NFL." Id. at 623.
155 Id. at 614.
156 Id. at 615. Applying the test to the facts at hand, the court concluded that the
Rozelle Rule satisfied the first two prongs. Id. However, the court accepted the dis-
trict court's findings that the Rule was thrust upon a weak union, and that the play-
ers did not receive consideration for agreeing to the restraint. Id. at 616. Hence, the
exemption could not be applied. Id.
157 STAuDOHAR, supra note 56, at 88; see Francis E. Zollers, From Gridiron to
Courtroom to Bargaining Table: The New National Football League Agreement, 17
AM. Bus. L.J. 133 (1979-80) (discussion of 1977 agreement).
158 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NATIONAL FOoTBALL
LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOcIATION AND THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE MANAGEMENT
CouNcm, Dec. 11, 1982, at art. XV, reprinted in BERRY & WONG, supra note 58, § 3.44,
at 185-86 [hereinafter 1982 NFL AGREEMENT].
159 Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989
DuKE L.J. 339, 348-49 n.57 (1989).
160 1982 NFL AGREEMENT, supra note 158, at art. XV, reprinted in BERRY &
WONG, supra note 58, § 3.44, at 185-86. A discussion of the details of this system is
not particularly necessary or important in light of the monumental recent develop-
ments in NFL litigation. See infra notes 162-92 and accompanying text.
161 Lock, supra note 159 at 348-49. The restrictive effect of the "new" system is
best exemplified by the fact that only two players changed teams as free agents be-
tween 1977 and 1991, a time when the new team was required to compensate the
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b. Recent Developments
After the 1982 Agreement expired in 1987, the players went
on strike, primarily for free agency.162 The strike quickly fell
apart, however, and the players elected to continue the season.
163
Shortly thereafter, the players brought suit.
6 4
In Powell v. NFL,'65 the players challenged the Right of First
Refusal/Compensation System.' 66 The United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota refused to grant the NFL abso-
lute protection through the nonstatutory labor exemption.'67 A
more troublesome issue in Powell, however, was the extent to
which the labor exemption continues once the CBA has expired,'
68
a question that remained unanswered after the Mackey deci-
sion.169 The district court held that the exemption continues until
an "impasse"7 0 is reached between the bargaining parties. A later
former. Id. at 348-49 n.57. In 1977, Norm Thompson moved from the St. Louis
Cardinals to the Baltimore Colts in exchange for a third round draft choice; in 1988,
Wilbur Marshall moved from the Chicago Bears to the Washington Redskins in ex-
change for two first round draft choices. Id. It is interesting to note that the cost for
Marshall was not too onerous since the Redskins, as Super Bowl champions the year
before, surrendered the last draft choice of the first round. STAUDOHAR, supra note 56,
at 89; see also Leigh Steinberg, Negotiating Contracts in the National Football
League, in LAw OF PROFESSioNAL AND AmTsuR SPORTS, supra note 99, § 6.02[1][b][ii]-
[iii], at 6-5 to -6 (discussing lack of free agent movement from 1989-1991). Such reper-
cussions have helped spark recent court actions against the NFL. See infra notes 162-
92 and accompanying text.
162 Lock, supra note 159, at 367.
163 James D. McFarland, Views of Sport; Strike Aftermath: The Union's Next
Step, N.Y. TnEs, Oct. 18, 1987, § 5, at 13.
164 See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
165 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991) [hereinafter Powell 1].
166 Id. at 779.
167 Id. at 783. The court refused to "extend indefinite, blanket protection to union-
employer agreements merely because the challenged activity [arose] within the con-
text of mandatory collective bargaining." Id.
168 Id.; see also Lock, supra note 159 (court declined to address result of expira-
tion of agreement on labor exemption); Hobel, supra note 6, at 195-98 (suggesting that
expiration date does not trigger retraction of labor exemption); Releasing Superstars,
supra note 12, at 888-94 (discussing whether labor exemption should continue after
expiration of CBA).
169 543 F.2d 606, 616 n.18 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
"[We need not decide whether the effect of an agreement extends beyond its formal
expiration date for purposes of the labor exemption." Id.
170 Powell I, 678 F. Supp. at 788. Impasse occurs when good faith negotiations fail
to create an agreement between the parties. Id. at 784 n.15.
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hearing established that an impasse had indeed been reached in
Powell. 17 1
The Eighth Circuit reversed, however, finding that an im-
passe is not the endpoint of the exemption. 172 Even if it were, the
court noted that an impasse had not been reached.'7 3 The court
held that as long as an "ongoing collective bargaining relation-
ship" exists, the exemption may continue.'7 4
In response, the NFL Players' Association decertified and
ceased to act as the collective bargaining unit for the players.' 7 5
This was achieved through a vote of 62% of the active union mem-
bers.'7 6 In a later proceeding, the Powell court determined that
the "ongoing collective bargaining relationship" was nonexis-
tent; 77 therefore, the NFL no longer had the benefit of the non-
statutory labor exemption.' 78
While the Powell appeal was pending, the NFL owners unilat-
erally altered the existing free agent system, creating Plan B.' 79
Under Plan B, each team was allowed to reserve thirty-seven
players on their roster who were subject to the Right of First Re-
fusal/Compensation System.-8 0 Those not reserved became un-
171 Powell v. NFL, 711 F. Supp. 959, 961 (D. Minn.), rev'd, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991) [hereinafter Powell III]. The district court set
the date of impasse at June 17, 1988. Id. The court denied the players' request for a
preliminary injunction against the player restraints. Powell v. NFL, 690 F. Supp. 812,
818 (D. Minn. 1989)[hereinafter Powel 111.
172 Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293, 1302 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040
(1991) [hereinafter Powell].
173 Id. at 1304 n.2.
174 Id. at 1303-04. The implication of this statement is that the mere presence of
an active union may protect the restraints from antitrust liability. See id. The dissent,
however, stressed that union approval, as opposed to mere involvement, should be
determinative. Id. at 1305 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see Releasing
Superstars, supra note 12, at 885 (criticizing Powell and arguing that union consent
should determine applicability of exemption).
175 Powell and McNeil v. NFL, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1356 (D. Minn. 1991) [hereinaf-
ter McNeil 1] (detailing decertification process).
176 Id. The court also held that a formal decertification process was not necessary
to end the collective bargaining relationship; rather, rejection by a majority of employ-
ees was enough. Id. at 1358. This analysis was posed by the dissent in Powell, but not
answered. Powell, 930 F.2d at 1305 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
177 McNeil I, 764 F. Supp. at 1358. The NFL took advantage of the situation by
altering insurance benefits and extending the season. Id. at 1359. These actions
would not have been possible if a collective bargaining relationship existed. Id.
178 Id.
179 See Lock, supra note 159, at 347.
180 See Steinberg, supra note 161, § 6.02[1][b], at 6-4; see also 1982 NFL AGREE-
smNT, supra note 158, at art. XV, reprinted in BERRY & WONG, supra note 58, § 3.44,
at 185-86 (detailing compensation system).
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restricted free agents.'18  Plan B was somewhat beneficial to the
players, particularly in terms of salaries. 182
The players again commenced suit in McNeil v. NFL."3 The
court rejected the NFL's "single entity" defense-that its member
clubs act as a single economic unit, and thus, could not form ille-
gal combinations.' 84 The players' request for per se scrutiny of
Plan B was also rejected.' 5 After a lengthy trial, the jury found
the restraints to be excessive and returned a verdict in favor of the
players.' 8 6 The jury, however, acknowledged that some restric-
tions should still be allowed.18 7
Immediately thereafter, ten free agents filed suit seeking to
declare themselves free of the Plan B restrictions. 88 The district
court enjoined the NFL from using Plan B against the players for
a period of five days.'8 9 During those five days the players were
free to sign with other teams and three of them did.' 90
Reggie White of the Philadelphia Eagles then brought a class
action suit against the NFL, asking that all players whose con-
tracts were to expire on February 1, 1993 be declared unrestricted
181 Steinberg, supra note 161, § 6.02[l][b], at 6-4. Plan B players were free to
move from February 1 to April 1. Id. Although some players gained freedom, over
1000 players, most of them high-profile players, did not. Id.
182 Ian C. Pulver, A Face Off Between the National Hockey League and the Na-
tional Hockey League Players' Association: The Goal a More Competitively Balanced
League, 2 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 39, 59 (1991) (quoting M.J. Duberstein, Plan B Un-
restricted Players: The Two Year Record, SIGNALS, Pub. No. 1, National Football
League Players' Association 18 (Winter 1990-91)). Those who moved via Plan B in
1989 and 1990 saw their salaries improve by 61%. Id. By extension, reserved players
also saw their salaries increase. See WmLA1 J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOM-
ics PmNcIPLEs AND POLICY 819 (1988) (monopsonist must raise wage rate when tak-
ing on another employee); Steinberg, supra note 161, § 6.O2[l][b][ii], at 6-5.
183 McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992) [hereinafter McNeil II].
184 Id. at 880; see supra note 65 (discussing "single entity" defense).
185 McNeil II, 790 F. Supp. at 897; see supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text
(noting per se violations of Sherman Act).
186 Bob Oates, Analysis, Will NFL Have to Go to Plan C?, L.A. TnEs, Sept. 11,
1992, at C1. All told, there were 32 witnesses and 1700 pieces of evidence. Id.
187 Id.
188 Jackson v. NFL, 802 F. Supp. 226, 228 (D. Minn. 1992).
189 Id. at 235. At the end, only four players remained: Keith Jackson, Webster
Slaughter, Garin Veris, and D.J. Dozier. Id. at 228. The other six were freed from
their respective teams' reserved lists by being traded or released. Id.
190 Don Pierson, Long Wait Begins in the NFL: Freed Players Start to Move, CHI.
Tam., Sept. 30, 1992, at C1. Jackson signed with the Miami Dolphins, Slaughter with
the Houston Oilers, and Veris with the San Francisco 49ers. Id. Dozier was released
by the Detroit Lions. Id.
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free agents.' 91 The suit settled, and the longstanding struggle be-
tween the NFL and its players was finally resolved in a new CBA,
with a liberalized system of free agency.192
3. Hockey
The NHL unilaterally introduced a free agent compensation
system after its perpetual reserve system was struck down.' 93
That system was indistinguishable from the Rozelle Rule' 94 ex-
cept for one key difference: if the teams could not agree on the
amount of compensation, a neutral, binding arbitrator would
make the final decision.' 95 In McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., a
player sued to enjoin the league from enforcing such an arbitra-
tion award. 96 The NHL defended its compensation system by
claiming immunity from antitrust liability through the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption. 197 The district court held the exemption in-
applicable because the third prong of the Mackey test, that the
agreement come from bona fide, arms-length negotiating, was not
satisfied by a system thrust upon a weak union with little or no
bargaining power.-98 The court also rejected the NHL's contention
191 Shapiro, supra note 8. Nearly 300 players would have become unrestricted
free agents. Id.
192 See infra notes 304-27 and accompanying text (discussion of new NFL
agreement).
193 WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 23, § 5.06, at 93; see also supra notes 104-10
and accompanying text (discussing elimination of NHL reserve system).
194 See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text (detailing Rozelle Rule).
195 STAuDOHAR, supra note 56, at 150. Under the Rozelle Rule, the commissioner
made the ultimate decision if an agreement could not be reached. See supra note 140
(language of Rozelle Rule).
196 460 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. Mich. 1978), vacated, 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979). An
arbitrator decided that the Detroit Red Wings had to give up Dale McCourt as com-
pensation for signing goaltender Rogie Vachon of the Los Angeles Kings. McCourt,
600 F.2d at 1196. As a rookie, McCourt led the Red Wings in scoring. Id. McCourt
refused to report to the Kings and brought suit. Id.
197 McCourt, 460 F. Supp. at 910.
198 Id. at 910-11. Judge DiMascio stated:
The preponderance of evidence ... establishes that bylaw 9A was not the
product of bona fide arm's length bargaining over any of its anticompetitive
provisions. The evidence establishes that the bylaw was unilaterally im-
posed upon the NHLPA and was incorporated into the collective bargaining
agreement in the identical language it contained when it was first adopted
by the League.
. [T]he mere inclusion of bylaw 9A in the collective bargaining agree-
ment cannot serve to immunize it from antitrust sanctions. The evidence...
persuades us that the parties did not collectively bargain for bylaw 9A_
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that the players received valid consideration for the inclusion of
the system in the CBA.199
Although there was considerable evidence to show that the
players did not want this system,2 °° the Sixth Circuit reversed,
finding that the third prong of the Mackey test had been satisfied;
the players bargained against the system and lost fairly.201 Fur-
thermore, unlike the district court, the Sixth Circuit found that
the NHL owners provided consideration to the players in ex-
change for their acceptance of the system, in that the players were
given the option to terminate the agreement if the NHL merged
with the VA.2 °2 McCourt was thus distinguishable from Mackey
since the disputed restraint was specifically included in the
CBA.203
199 Id. at 911. 'The bylaw was included in the collective bargaining agreement to
give the impression that it was a bargained-for provision." Id.
200 McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1202-03.
It is apparent from those very findings that the NILPA used every form of
negotiating pressure it could muster. It developed an alternate reserve sys-
tem... only to have the proposal rejected by the players. It refused to at-
tend a proposed meeting with the owners to discuss the reserve system fur-
ther. It threatened to strike. It threatened to commence an antitrust suit
and to recommend that the players not attend training camp.
Id. at 1202.
201 Id. at 1203. Judge Engel reasoned:
[T]he inclusion of the reserve system in the collective bargaining agreement
was the product of good faith, arm's-length bargaining .... [W]hat the trial
court saw as a failure to negotiate was in fact simply the failure to succeed,
after the most intensive negotiations, in keeping an unwanted provision out
of the contract. This failure was a part of and not apart from the collective
bargaining process ....
Id. The fact that one side prevailed does not mean that good faith negotiations did not
take place. Id. at 1200 (citation omitted); see National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1992) ("[Siuch obligation [to bargain collectively] does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession ...
202 McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1202.
203 Robert C. Berry & William B. Gould, A Long Deep Drive to Collective Bargain-
ing: Of Players, Owners, Brawls and Strikes, 31 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 685,769 (1981).
"McCourt had the... distinction of being the first major sports case to confront the
labor exemption when the clause in controversy was specifically incorporated into the
league's collective bargaining agreement." Id.
Even after he lost on appeal, McCourt refused to go to Los Angeles. Pulver, supra
note 182, at 39, 46-47. The Los Angeles Kings and Detroit Red Wings ultimately
agreed on a different compensation package consisting of a player and two draft
choices. Id.
The case generated a significant amount of commentary. See Christopher B. An-
drews, Note, Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws, Shielding an Anticompetitive
Provision Devised by an Employer Group in Its Own Interest: McCourt v. California
Sports, Inc., 21 B.C. L. REv. 680 (1980); Douglas A. Econn, Note, Servitude in Profes-
sional Sports-McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 2 WHrrrmR L. REv. 559 (1980);
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With several modifications, hockey emerged from its most re-
cent strike with a new compensation system.2 °4 Players are now
placed into three age groups.20 5 Group I contains the youngest
players, who may choose whether their former team is entitled to
draft pick compensation, or as in McCourt, allow an arbitrator to
select one of the club's compensation offers.20 6 Group II players
have the same option,20 7 however, in this category, compensation
is determined by the player's new salary.2 0 Group HI players are
unrestricted and no type of compensation for the former team is
required.20 9
Due to the potential unfairness with this approach,210 it is
submitted that the NHL should allow arbitrators to determine the
Paul L. Nelson, Note, Professional Sports and the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption to
Federal Antitrust Law: McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 11 U. TOL. L. REv. 633
(1980).
204 Players are the Big Winners, THE SPORTING NEWS, Apr. 20, 1992, at 51.
205 Id. Group I consists of players who are 24 years of age or younger; Group H is
comprised of players from 25-29 years of age; and Group III is composed of players
who are 30 years of age or older. Id.
206 Id. If a Group I player chooses to entitle his former team to draft pick compen-
sation, his old team also receives a right of first refusal. Id.
207 Id. The former team gets a right of first refusal no matter what choice a Group
II player makes. Id. If the player signs for less than $350,000 a year, however, no
right of first refusal is allowed. Id.
208 Id. Draft pick compensation for Group II players is tied directly to the players'
new salary:
New Salary (Year) Compensation
Under $200,000 None
$200,000 - $250,000 One third round pick
$251,000 - $350,000 One second round pick
$351,000 - $500,000 One first round pick
$501,000 - $1,000,000 Two first round picks
Over $1,000,000 Three first round picks.
Id.
209 Id.
210 Pulver, supra note 182, at 49 n.56 (citing NHL BY-LAw § 9A.8(c)). The poten-
tial unfairness can best be seen in the Brendan Shanahan-Scott Stevens case. Id. at
49-51, 86-87. The St. Louis Blues surrendered five first round draft picks as compen-
sation for signing Stevens from the Washington Capitals in 1990. Id. at 52. The fol-
lowing year, they signed Shanahan from the New Jersey Devils. Id. at 49. The Blues
and Devils could not agree on compensation so the matter went before an arbitrator.
Id. at 49-50. The Devils asked for Stevens while the Blues offered a combination of
players and draft choices. Id. The arbitrator, bound to choose one side or the other,
sent Stevens to New Jersey. Id. at 50. The Blues' final price for Shanahan was five
first round draft choices plus Scott Stevens. Id. at 86; see also Bob Verdi, Blues Pay
Dearly for 'Free' Agent, Cm. Tam., Sept. 5, 1991, at 1 (criticizing NHL arbitration
system).
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compensation required for signing Group I players, rather than
forcing them to select one of the club's offers.
4. Basketball
The NBA is the only professional sports league where a
player's former team receives no free agent compensation.211 Free
agents are classified into two groups: restricted and un-
restricted.212 Restricted free agents are those who have not fully
performed two player contracts213 and have less than four years of
NBA service at the end of the 1992-93 season.214 These players
are subject to a right of first refusal whereby a former team can
match any offer a player receives and retain that player's serv-
ices.216 All other players are unrestricted and are free to move as
they wish.
2 16
C. The Collegiate/Amateur Draft
A draft is the process of selection of amateur players by pro-
fessional teams.21  Generally, teams with poorer records pick
before those with better records.218 The purpose of this is to help
improve the weaker teams so that the league may become more
211 BERRY & WONG, supra note 58, § 3.45, at 190. The issue of free agent compen-
sation was not discussed in Robertson v. NBA since its details were not in the record.
389 F. Supp. 867, 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text
(discussing Robertson).
212 1988 NBA AGREEMENT, supra note 123, at art. V, reprinted in LAW OF PROFES-
SIONAL AND A mTEuR SPORTS, supra note 99, at 7-68.
213 Id. § 1(b), at 7-69. If a player receives a negotiated extension of his first con-
tract, for purposes of determining his free agency status, he is deemed to have per-
formed one contract and remains restricted. Id. § 1(c), at 7-69.
214 Id. § 1(a)(1)(vi), at 7-68; see id. § l(a)(2), at 7-68 to -69 (calculating years of
service).
215 Id. § 3(a)-(f), at 7-70 to -71. To be able to exercise its right, the former team
must make a Qualifying Offer to the player before July 1. Id. § 3(a)-(b), at 7-70. The
offer must include a one year slot at a salary of at least 125% of the salary paid in the
last year of the player's previous contract, or $250,000, whichever is greater. Id.
§ 3(b), at 7-70. Ifa player receives an offer from a different team, he must submit it to
his former team. Id. § 5, at 7-71. If his former team does not match the offer within
fifteen days, the player is deemed to have entered into a binding contract with the
new team. Id. § 5(b), at 7-71.
216 Id. § 2(c)(6), at 7-69 to -70. A powerful limitation on widespread player mobil-
ity is the salary cap, which limits the amount of money each NBA team can spend on
player salaries. See id. at art. VII, at 7-77 to -95; see also infra notes 277-83 and
accompanying text (broad discussion of salary cap).
217 WEisTAnT & LowELL, supra note 23, § 5.03, at 504.
218 Id.
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competitive.2 19 Once chosen, a player can negotiate only with the
team that selected him.2 2 0 It has been argued that this restriction
acts as a group boycott of the player,2 2 ' thus violating the Sher-
man Act.2 22
The first case to address the draft issue was Smith v. Pro-
Football, Inc.223 James (Yazoo) Smith was drafted as the twelfth
pick in the first round of the 1968 draft by the Washington Red-
skins.224 Although Smith signed a one year contract, his career
ended after the 1968 season due to a neck injury.22 5 Smith
claimed that he would have earned more money, with possible
guaranteed payments for injuries, had he been free to negotiate
with any team.2 2 6
The district court condemned the draft as a group boycott, a
per se violation of the Sherman Act.227 Since Smith was drafted
before a CBA was in place, the nonstatutory labor exemption
could not be applied.228 Furthermore, the Smith decision preceded
the Eighth Circuit's determination in Mackey that a Rule of
Reason analysis should be applied to player restraints.229 The
court noted, however, that even under a Rule of Reason approach,
the draft did not pass muster.23 0 Accordingly, the court suggested
219 Id.; see Zollers, supra note 157, at 147-48.
220 Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738, 741 (D.D.C. 1976), modified, 593 F.2d
1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The drafted player faces a monopsony, in which there is only
one buyer for his services. See JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
304 n.1 (1984). This should be distinguished from a monopoly, which is a lone seller of
goods or services. Id. A monopsonist pays lower wages than a perfect competitor. See
BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 182, at 819.
221 See Smith, 420 F. Supp. at 746 (draft system "utterly strips [players] of any
measure of control over the marketing of their talents").
222 See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959)
(defining scope and forbidden status of group boycotts).
223 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), modified, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
224 Id. at 740.
225 Id. at 740-41.
226 Id. at 741.
227 Id. at 744. "This outright, undisguised refusal to deal constitutes a group boy-
cott in its classic and most pernicious form, a device which has long been condemned
as a per se violation of the antitrust laws." Id. (citations omitted).
228 Smith, 420 F. Supp. at 742; see also Kapp, 390 F. Supp. at 85-86 (player not
bound by retroactive application of CBA). See generally supra notes 12-16 (discussing
nonstatutory labor exemption).
229 See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing Mackey and Rule of
Reason).
230 Smith, 420 F. Supp. at 745. The NFL claimed that in the absence of a draft,
the more talented players would flock to the wealthy teams. Id. at 745-46. The league
contended, therefore, that the draft was indispensable to maintaining the "competi-
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less restrictive draft alternatives which might survive such a
standard.23 1
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
having had the benefit of the Mackey opinion, rejected the per se
holding of the lower court.232 The court found that the draft dif-
fered from a group boycott in two ways: (1) NFL teams are not
pure competitors, but more like joint venturers; 33 and (2) the
draft was designed to be procompetitive rather than anticompeti-
tive.234 The effect of the draft as applied, however, was deemed to
be an unreasonable restraint of trade, by "eliminat[ing] economic
competition among buyers for the services of sellers."23 5 In addi-
tion, any alleged procompetitive effects were athletic and not eco-
nomic, so the Rule of Reason balancing test could not help the
NFL.2 6 Nevertheless, the court conceded that some form of draft
system was necessary.237
While Smith was on appeal, the NFL and the union reached
an agreement on draft provisions. 238 The most notable changes
tive balance" needed to attract and hold spectator interest. Id. The court, skeptical of
these claims, stated that the draft was only one of many factors affecting players'
decisions to play in one city rather than another and that, as it stood, the draft was
too restrictive. Id. at 746.
231 Id. at 747. For example, at the time of Smith, a draft consisting of two rounds
instead of the seventeen would be less restrictive. Id. Although the court conceded
that draft restraints may be needed to insure that the best players are distributed
throughout the league, a less restrictive draft with only two rounds would affect only
56 players, as opposed to the 476 players by a seventeen round draft. Id.
The court also suggested allowing several teams to draft a particular player while
restricting the number of players each team could sign. Id. Each player could then
decide which offer to accept, allowing for a "more [expanded] free market system for
determining new-player salaries." Id.
232 Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
233 Id. at 1179; see also Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976) (noting
joint venture characteristics of NFL), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
234 Smith, 593 F.2d at 1179. 'The drait... is designed not to insulate the NFL
from competition, but to improve the entertainment product by enhancing its teams'
competitive equality." Id. (footnote omitted).
235 Id. at 1186.
236 Id. "Because the draft's 'anticompetitive' and 'procompetitive' effects are not
comparable, it is impossible to 'net them out' in the usual rule-of-reason balancing."
Id.
237 Id. at 1187 ("[W]e do not foreclose the possibility that some type of player
selection system might be defended as serving 'to regulate and promote... competi-
tion' in the market for players' services." (quoting National Soc'y of Professional
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978))).
238 See Jeffrey D. Schneider, Note, Unsportsmanlike Conduct: The Lack of Free
Agency in the NFL, 64 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 797, 812 (1991) (draft system one of many
issues on which players "caved in").
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were the twelve-round limit 23 9 and the nonperpetual right of ex-
clusive negotiation. 240 These changes alone would not insulate the
draft from antitrust scrutiny; however, presuming that the
Mackey test was satisfied by the collective bargaining that
brought about the draft agreement,24 ' the nonstatutory labor ex-
emption would apply and preclude antitrust inquiry.2 4 2
The basketball draft was challenged in Robertson v. NBA.24 s
The court's preliminary determination was that the draft acted as
a group boycott, a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 2 " The case
eventually settled, however, and as part of the settlement, the
parties agreed that a player who could not reach an agreement
with the team which drafted him would be permitted to re-enter
the draft the following year.245 Thus, a player is no longer re-
quired to negotiate with the team that drafted him for more than
one year.246
Beginning in 1988, the number of draft rounds was reduced to
three and currently stands at two, as mandated by the most re-
cent CBA.247 Interestingly, the district court in Smith posited that
a two-round draft would be a less restrictive means of distributing
239 Id. at 812 n.ll0. The new NFL Agreement establishes a seven-round limit
starting in 1994. 1993 NFL AGREEMENT, supra note 131, at art. XVI, § 2.
240 See Zollers, supra note 157, at 148. The drafting team has exclusive negotiat-
ing rights for one year at the end of which the player may re-enter the draft if un-
signed. Id. If he remains unsigned after the second draft, he becomes an unrestricted
free agent who may contract with any team. Id.; see also 1993 NFL AGREEMENT, supra
note 131, at art. XVI, §§ 4(b), 8 (containing same provisions).
241 Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S.
801 (1977); see also supra notes 155-56, 159 and accompanying text (discussing
Mackey test).
242 See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 613; see also supra notes 12-16 and accompanying
text (detailing nonstatutory labor exemption).
243 389 F. Supp. 867, 891 nn.43-44, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
244 Id. at 893. The court noted Justice Douglas' reinstatement of a preliminary
injunction against the NBA's "Four-year Rule," which prohibited contract negotia-
tions with a player who had graduated from high school within the previous four
years. Id. at 893-94 n.48 (citing Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204 (Douglas, Circuit
Justice, 1971)).
245 STAUDOHAR, supra note 56, at 120.
246 Id. The draft was unsuccessfully challenged by a player who joined the NBA
after the 1983 Agreement was ratified. Wood v. NBA, 602 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y.
1984), affd, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987). The basis of the suit was that he could not be
bound by an agreement that he was not a party to. Id. at 529.
247 1988 NBA AGREEMENT, supra note 123, at art. IV, § 1(a), reprinted in LAw OF
PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 99, at 7-64.
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talent by limiting the number of players who would be obligated to
negotiate with only one club.248
III. ECONOMICS AND COMPETITIVE BALANCE
The justification for restraints on player mobility is the fear
that absent such restrictions, players would migrate to wealthy
big city teams, damaging the league's competitive balance.24 9 This
result is predicated on the economic theory of wage determination
in professional sports, which dictates that players' salaries are a
product of the net revenue they create for their teams.250 Teams
become wealthy through increased revenue, which in turn, di-
rectly relates to the quality of the team's play.251 As a result, these
wealthier teams will attract the quality free agents.252 Whether
this analysis is accurate, however, is debatable.
A Economic Developments Pertaining to Free Agency
1. Team Owners as Profit Maximizers
A typical profit-maximizing monopsonist will purchase labor
until the marginal revenue product of the additional unit of labor
equals its marginal factor cost.253 Marginal revenue product
(MRP) refers to the increased benefit, through revenue, of the ad-
ditional labor unit.2 54 Marginal factor cost (MFC) is the increase
in cost, mostly through salary, of the additional unit.255
In the sports world, it is possible, indeed probable, that there
are team owners who would place success on the field ahead of
profits, signing free agents whose MFC exceeds MRP.25 6
Although this notion tends to detract from the proposition that
248 Smith, 420 F. Supp. at 747.
249 See, e.g., Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280, 287 (8th Cir. 1978) (complete free-
dom of movement would result in best franchises acquiring most of top players);
Mackey, 543 F.2d at 621.
250 Roger G. Noll, The Economics of Sports Leagues, in LAw OF PROFEssIONAL AND
AmTEUR SPORTS, supra note 99, § 17.03[4], at 17-25.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 HIRsHLEIFER, supra note 220, at 348.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 See Smith, 420 F. Supp. at 746. "According to this argument, the owners...
[would] not care if they [lost] money on the operation of their teams, as long as they
[won] games, i.e. they do not conform to the principles of economic decision-making
upon which the antitrust laws are premised." Id.
19931 627
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such owners are typical profit maximizers,25 7 such doubt is allevi-
ated by recognition that success on the field has its long-term eco-
nomic advantages.2 58 It is submitted that an owner may accept
short-term economic losses in the hope that playing success will
increase revenues in the future, effectively paying off the earlier
investment. Consequently, it is suggested that owners are long-
term profit maximizers, and that, whether player restraints exist
or not, players will still move to wealthier markets.
For example, suppose a third baseman on the Houston Astros
has a salary of $750,000 and brings in $1 million in revenue. The
Boston Red Sox conclude that the same player could produce $2
million in revenue for them. Assuming that both teams are profit
maximizers, in an unrestricted system, the Red Sox will sign the
player for some salary over $1 million, since Houston cannot pay
more than $1 million and make a profit on the player. Conse-
quently, Houston would lose the $250,000 in profit the player
creates.
Similarly, under the restraint of the free agent compensation
system, Houston will accept some amount above $250,000 for the
loss of the player. If Boston pays $500,000, Houston would still
make money even without the player. Boston would benefit as
well, since its marginal costs would still be less than $2 million.
The payment to Houston, however, would probably reduce the sal-
ary paid to the player. As far as the teams are concerned, the only
difference in the two scenarios is the benefit, or lack thereof, to the
former team.259
2. Equality of Revenue in the NFL
A successful team will have higher attendance figures, and
consequently, higher revenues 260 over subsequent seasons. 261 A
257 David Mills, The Blue Line and the Bottom Line: Entrepreneurs and the Busi-
ness of Hockey in Canada, 1927-90, in Ttm BUsImss OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 175,
192-93 (Paul D. Staudohar & James A. Mangan eds. 1991) (discussing Edmonton Oil-
ers owner Peter Pocklington and his desire to place profits before performance).
258 See Noll, supra note 250, § 17.03[1], at 17-15.
259 Id. § 17.0314], at 17-25 to -26.
260 WEisTART & LOWELL, supra note 23, § 5.07, at 595 (citing HENRY DEMMERT,
THE ECONOMUCS OF PROFESSIONAL TEAm SPORTS 11 (1973)). Professor Demmert di-
vided the 1971 baseball teams into two groups based on their won-lost records: good




notable exception to this rule can be found in the NFL,262 where
all teams share television and merchandising revenue equally.263
In addition, the visiting team is entitled to 40% of gate receipts.2
This has resulted in a distribution of revenue ranging from $43-
$47 million per year per team.265 It has been argued that equaliz-
ing revenue reduces the incentive for owners to improve their
clubs because future success will not lead to significantly higher
revenues. 266 Although this argument is valid, it is submitted that
the NFL posture is preferable to that of major league baseball's,
where wide disparities in revenue inhibit certain teams from
signing necessary players, thus preventing improvement on the
field.267
3. Player Salaries in Baseball
Free agency has helped fuel the dramatic rise in player sala-
ries since 1976.268 This increase was tempered in the mid-80's
through illegal collusive agreements between the owners not to





Id. As can be seen, a good team attracts more fans, whether at home or on the road.
See id.
261 Noll, supra note 250, § 17.03[1], at 17-15.
262 Id. § 17.02[1], at 17-6. "In general, the profitability of football teams is not
closely correlated with their success on the playing field or even their total revenues."
Id.
263 Mike Doming, Hockey Touted as Growth Sport of the 90's, CALGARY HERALD,
Oct. 11, 1992, at F7.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Lock, supra note 159, at 358 n.108; see supra note 261 and accompanying text.
267 See infra notes 320-23 and accompanying text (discussing baseball's revenue
structure and proposing revenue sharing system).
268 Pulver, supra note 182, at 64. "[T]he implementation of a free agent system
has had a direct effect on the escalation of player salaries in Major League Baseball."
Id. The following table shows the trend in average salaries.
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bid on free agents in an effort to keep salaries down.269 The cur-
rent CBA includes a provision specifically forbidding such ac-
tions.2  If baseball owners are profit maximizers, then the reve-
nues produced by free agents should still exceed costs, even at
these higher salaries.2
An issue which needs to be addressed, however, is the tre-
mendous difference in local television broadcasting revenues
around the league.272 With player costs in baseball reaching sev-



















* calculations performed by author
Id. at 64 n.126 (reporting 1976-1990 salary figures); Six Times a Whopper for Bobby
B., THE SPORTING NEWS, Dec. 16, 1991, at 31 (reporting 1991 salary figure); Seventy-
one Players in $3 Million League, CHI. TRm., Dec. 17, 1992, at N3 (reporting 1992
salary figure); Phil Rogers, Fighting Off Curveballs; Despite Dire Predictions, Base-
ball Still A Hit, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Oct. 17, 1993, at IA (reporting 1993 salary
figure).
269 STAUDOHAR, supra note 56, at 40-41. For their actions, the owners were or-
dered by an arbitrator to pay over $100 million in damages. See Ross Newhan, Own-
ers' Penalties Multiply; Collusion: Second Ruling by Baseball Arbitrator Puts the Fine
at $102.5 Million, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1990, at C1. In addition to fining the owners,
earlier collusion rulings reinstated the free agency status of some players so that
other teams could take a "new-look" at them. Id. For example, "new-look" free agency
allowed Kirk Gibson to leave the Detroit Tigers and sign with the Los Angeles Dodg-
ers. Id.
270 1990 MLB AGREEMENT, supra note 99, at art. XX, § F, reprinted in LAW OF
PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 99, at 5-69 to -71.
271 See supra notes 253-59 and accompanying text.
272 Jerome Holtzman, In Cost Squeeze, Baseball Charting the Unknown, Cm.
Tnm., Oct. 4, 1992, at C1 (listing each baseball team's annual local television
revenue).
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enty percent of revenue2 7 3 it is suggested that some form of reve-
nue sharing is needed so that certain teams do not become perma-
nently mired in mediocrity by being unable to afford the higher
salaries of better players. Presently, there are some indications
that the owners are moving towards such a system.275
4. The Salary Cap in the NBA
In an effort to control salaries, proposals have been made to
limit the amount a team may spend. The NBA currently uses
such a system, 7 reserving 53 percent of the league's gross reve-
nues for salaries.2 7 8 That amount, after some minor deductions, is
divided evenly among the teams to determine what each may
spend.2 7 9 There are certain exceptions, however.2 0 The most no-
table allows teams to exceed the cap when resigning their own
free agents.28 ' No such exception exists regarding free agents
from other teams.28 2 Despite the liberal rules governing mobility,
this salary cap effectively limits free agent movement in the
NBA.28 3
273 Id.
274 Peter Gammons, It's Back to Square One for the Pirates, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
8, 1992, at 55 (tracing dismantling of three time National League East champion
Pittsburgh Pirates due to insufficient revenue to sign all-star free agents); Ray Parisi,
Jr., Pirates Trade Lind, Waive Four Players, WASH. TnEs, Nov. 20, 1992, at D4
(same).
275 Sportscenter (ESPN television broadcast, Feb. 23, 1993) (Peter Gammons, Di-
amond Notes).
276 See Pulver, supra note 182, at 83-84 (discussing salary cap in hockey); Murray
Chass, For Baseball, the Worst of Times May Come After the Best of Seven, N.Y.
Tncms, Oct. 19, 1992, at 154 (discussing salary cap in baseball); Manny Topol, Tag-
liabue: Cap Yes, Four-Year Plan No, N.Y. NEWsDAY, Oct. 22, 1992, at 154 (discussing
salary cap in football).
277 See 1988 NBA AGREENMNT, supra note 123, at art. VII, reprinted in LAw OF
PaOFEssroNA AND ATmTEuR SPORTS, supra note 99, at 7-77 to -95.
278 See id. at Part D, § 1(b).
279 Id.
280 Id. at Part F, §§ 1-7.
281 Id. § 1(b)(3)(d).
282 1988 NBA AGREEMENT, supra note 123, at art. VII, Part F, § 1(b)(3)(d), re-
printed in LAW OF PROFEsSIONAL AND AMATJER SPORTS, supra note 99, at 7-89.
283 See supra notes 211-16 and accompanying text (detailing NBA free agency
rules). Indeed, the salary cap has been criticized for this reason. See D. Albert Daspin,
Of Hoops, Labor Dupes and Antitrust Ally-Qops: Fouling Out the Salary Cap, 62 IND.
L.J. 95, 104-06 (1986); Scott J. Foraker, Note, The National Basketball Association
Salary Cap: An Antitrust Violation?, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 157, 172-73 (1985).
The cap's effect on competition has also been debated. Compare Charles Grant-
ham, Dinosaur Shifts Balance to Owners, USA TODAY, Nov. 10, 1992, at 12C (remov-
ing salary cap will increase competition) with Gary Bettman, Fans Benefit from Alli-
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B. Competitive Balance
The pivotal question in this area is whether free agency has
destroyed competitive balance. It is first noted that reserve sys-
tem era mega-dynasties like the Boston Celtics, New York
Yankees, and Montreal Canadiens no longer exist.28 4 Addition-
ally, by using a common statistical device, known as the standard
deviation,2 s5 it can be shown that player mobility does not neces-
sarily have a negative impact on competitive balance.28 6 The stan-
dard deviation measures the variation in a given sample by com-
paring the average number of times each team should reach the
semifinals under the conditions of perfect competition to the ac-
tual number of times each team made the semifinals.28 7 The
smaller the amount of deviation, the greater the equality in the
sampled sport.2 8 Examining the semifinalists for each sport from
1977 to 1992,289 the standard deviations are as follows: baseball
(1.61), football (1.78), basketball (2.60), and hockey (2.72).29 0
Thus, the free agent mobility in baseball since the Messersmith
decision has produced the greatest variety of champions. 91
ance, USA TODAY, Nov. 10, 1992, at 12C (using salary cap has increased competitive
balance).
284 See Sam Smith, Reinsdorf Warily Talks of "Dynasty", CHI. Tam., Nov. 8, 1992,
at 17.
285 See W.J. CONOVER & RONALD L. IMAN, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN BusINEss
STATISTICS 114 (1983).
286 See infra notes 287-91 and accompanying text.
287 See generally CONOVER & IMAN, supra note 285.
288 Id.
289 See Steven F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643, 675-76
(1989) (using standard deviation method to show greater competitive balance in base-
ball than in football).
290 See INFORmATioN PLEAsE ALMANAC 913-15, 923-24, 932-34, 992-94 (Otto John-
son ed., 1993) (listing semifinalists). See generally CONOVER & IMAN, supra note 285,
at 114. The standard deviation is calculated as follows. First, the average number of
times each team should reach the semifinals over the given period under perfect com-
petition is established. See id. This average is subtracted from the actual number of
times each individual team has made the semifinals. See id. Each result is squared
and then added together. Id. This sum is divided by the number of teams in the
league minus one. See id. Finally, the square root is taken. Id. This is the standard
deviation. Id.
291 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 101 (1975) (Seitz, Arb.). Nine different teams won the ten
World Series played between 1976 and 1985. WORLD ALmANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 889
(Hana U. Lane ed., 1985). The other sports with less player movement had more re-
peat champions. Id. There were three different Stanley Cup champions, five different




Apparently, then, free agents are not going only to the
wealthy teams, as the theory of wage determination in sports
predicts.29 2 In fact, two baseball studies concluded that a
franchise's success and local population had little bearing on
player movement.293 This is further illustrated by noting that the
Los Angeles Dodgers and the New York Mets, two of the wealthi-
est teams in baseball, had a net loss of free agents in the decade
after Messersmith.294 It is clear, therefore, that many factors af-
fect where a player wants to go; money is helpful, but not neces-
sarily dispositive.2 95
IV. A MODEST PROPOSAL
A Problems with Unrestricted Free Agency
It is submitted that unrestricted free agency is not in the best
interests of either the owners or the players.296 Most players con-
cede the validity of some restraints on player movement,297 owing
to the law of supply and demand.298 If there were a surplus of free
agents on the market each year, the excess supply would lower the
prices owners would be willing to pay for player services.29 9
292 See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
293 See Ross, supra note 289, at 683 (indicating there is "no systematic relation-
ship" between team's standing and its ability to sign free agents) (citation omitted).
294 Id.
295 See, e.g., Joseph Durso, Mark Davis Signs with Royals for $13 Million, N.Y.
TI s, Dec. 12, 1988, § 13, at 15. "[Tlhis is the fifth best offer we had.... if we were
going for money records, we could have gone someplace else .... Mark always felt
Kansas City was one of the leading places to play, with its ball park and the town
itself." Id. (quoting Davis' agent); see also Ross, supra note 289, at 682 n.168.
The simple fact is that professional athletes have as many geographical pref-
erences as lawyers, teachers, machinists, or Congressmen. Some people
want to live on the coast, some in the Midwest, and some in the South. Their
choices are based on family background, where their families live, where
they went to school, where they wish to raise a family, where they have edu-
cational and vocational opportunities. While obviously money is a factor,
there are many others. The primary one that I have found in talking with
professional athletes is that they will go where they can perform.
Id. (quoting Ed Garvey, former Director of the NFL Players' Association).
296 WEisTART & LOWELL, supra note 23, § 5.07, at 595-96.
297 See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 443 F.2d
264 (2d Cir. 1971), affd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); see also Topol, supra note 276 (sug-
gesting Reggie White publicly admitted unrestricted free agency was not what play-
ers were looking for).
298 See BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 182, at 62.
299 See id. This assumes that the owners' demand for free agents is constant. See
id. By restricting supply, the players can keep their salaries higher. See id.
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From the owners' perspective, free agency means many addi-
tional costs beyond player salaries. Most significant is the ex-
pense of developing a player's skills over the early part of his ca-
reer.300 In sports like football, it also means the extra time
invested by teaching new players offensive and defensive
systems.301
B. A Proposed Free Agency System
Accepting the proposition that some restrictions on player
movement are necessary, the difficulty arises in delineating which
restrictions should and should not continue. The proposed system
which follows attempts to reach a balance between the legitimate
interests of both players and owners. The newly-signed NFL
agreement will be compared.302
1. Minimum Years of Service
A "two contract" rule is suggested, whereby a player's mobil-
ity is restricted until he has fully performed two contracts as well
as five years of major league service.303 Similarly, the NFL agree-
ment requires five years of service, regardless of the number of
contracts completed. 0 4
2. Free Agent Compensation
During this restrictive period, a player is free to sign with any
club, subject to the former team's right of first refusal on any offer
received by the player. This right, however, may only be exercised
by former teams offering a twenty percent increase over the
300 See, e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed,
434 U.S. 801 (1977). This argument against free agency was explicitly rejected as an
ordinary cost of business which was not unique to sports. Id. Nonetheless, it is a real
expense and it can be substantial. Holtzman, supra note 272 (estimating that player-
related expenses for given club consume 70% of total club revenue).
301 Don Pierson, Miami's Shula: Witness for the Prosecution? Dolphins Quickly
Reap Free Agent Reward, Cm. Tram., Oct. 11, 1992, at Cl. Former Pittsburgh
Steelers head coach Chuck Noll testified at the McNeil jury trial about the complexity
of these systems. Id.
302 See 1993 NFL AGREEMENT, supra note 131.
303 See, e.g., 1988 NBA AGREEMENT, supra note 123, at art. V, § 1(a), (b), reprinted
in LAw OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 99, at 7-68 to -69. This
requirement is similar to the NBA rule, but with a slightly longer waiting period. See
id.
304 1993 NFL AGREEMENT, supra note 131, at art. XIX, § 1(a).
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player's previous salary.30 5 Should the former team choose not to
match an offer received by a player, that team is entitled to com-
pensation from the new team. As in baseball, the amount of com-
pensation will depend on how statistically successful the player
has been.30 6 The compensation provided will consist solely of fu-
ture draft choices, with a maximum of one first round and one
second round draft choice.3 07 In order to limit the burden on the
new club, multiple draft choices given as compensation can be ex-
ercised only in successive drafts, they cannot be used in the same
draft.
In marked contrast to prior agreements, the current NFL
agreement does not restrict player mobility after five years of ser-
vice. 08 Teams which lose certain unrestricted free agents get com-
pensatory picks from the league, however, which may be exercised
in the latter rounds.3 09 Free agents with less than five years of
service are still subject to a Right of First Refusal/Compensation
System.3 10 It is submitted that this kind of system encourages
305 See 1988 NBA AGREEMENT, supra note 123, at art. V, § 3(a), (b), reprinted in
LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMrATEUR SPORTS, supra note 99, at 7-70.
306 See 1990 NILB AGREEMENT, supra note 99, at art. XX, § B(4), reprinted in LAw
OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 99, at 5-65 to -66. Our system
could break down players in the following manner: top 15%, 15-30%, 30-45%, and 45-
60%.
307 See McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 904, 910 (E.D. Mich.
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979). "[A] capable, talented
rookie draft choice can be as exciting as an established player and sometimes is as
much an attraction for sports fans." Id. An analysis of the first round NHL picks from
1985-1987 shows that about 62% are currently on NHL rosters. THE HocEY NEWS,
Nov. 6, 1992 (listing of players on NHL rosters). It is estimated that 80% of the play-
ers in the NBA were drafted in the first two rounds. STAUDOHAR, supra note 56, at
129.
308 1993 NFL AGREENENT, supra note 131, at art. XIX, § 1(a). Free agents may
sign with other clubs only from March 1 to July 15. Id. § l(b)(i). The original club may
offer the player a 10% salary increase on June 1, and if the player is still unsigned by
July 15, he may only negotiate or sign with his original club for another year. Id. If he
is still unsigned after the additional year, he again becomes a free agent. Id.
§ 1(b)('ii). However, the original team cannot retain him on July 15 with a salary
increase. See id.; see also 1982 NFL AGREEmENT, supra note 158 at art. XV, reprinted
in BERRY & WONG, supra note 58, § 3.44, at 185-86 (detailing compensation required
for all free agents).
309 1993 NFL AGREEMENT, supra note 131, at art. XVI, § 2.
310 Id. at art. XIX, §§ 2-3. Restricted free agents may sign with new clubs from
March 1 to April 23. Id. § 2(h). All restricted free agents are subject to a right of first
refusal. Id. § 3(a). The former club has seven days to match the offer before losing all
rights to the player who will be deemed to have entered into a binding contract with
his new club. Id. § 3(c). The former club receives draft choice compensation which
escalates in proportion to the player's new salary. Id. § 2(b).
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wealthier teams to sign large numbers of free agents as they are
not responsible for providing compensation to the player's former
team. Although draft choice compensation may seem minimal to
some, it is suggested that a club cannot afford to surrender too
many draft choices without sacrificing its future success. 11
Further, under the NFL agreement, each team is given the
option to designate a "franchise player" who is not eligible to be-
come a free agent for the duration of his designation. 12 This may
be exercised once a year during the life of the agreement. 13 In
addition, a right of first refusal can be exercised against two play-
ers in 1993, one in 1994, and one in 1999. 31 4
3. Collegiate/Amateur Draft
The collegiate/amateur draft should be retained. One need
only look at the dramatic turnaround of the Dallas Cowboys,31 or
the huge difference Shaquille O'Neal has made for the Orlando
Magic,316 to conclude that the draft makes losing teams success-
ful. However, the draft as constituted need not extend beyond
four or five rounds. The NFL agreement lowered the number of
rounds from twelve317 to seven.318 As long as the best players are
allocated, there is no reason to restrict the rest.3 19 Furthermore, it
is suggested that new, young players are more susceptible to the
lure of big city money and fame than older, established players.
311 Paul Needell, Two Fly with Jets, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Mar. 9, 1993, at 56. In fact,
two prominent players, Ronnie Lott and Leonard Marshall, have already signed with
the New York Jets and their very wealthy owner Leon Hess. Id.
312 1993 NFL AGREEMENT, supra note 131, at art. XX, § 1. In order for a team to
retain its rights to a franchise player, it must offer either a 20% salary increase or the
average salary of the five highest paid players at his position, whichever is greater.
Id. § 2(a).
313 Id. § 1.
314 Id. § 3(a). In order to exercise this right, the free agent must be offered a 20%
salary increase or the average salary of the ten highest paid players at his position,
whichever is greater. Id. § 4(a).
315 Ed Werder, Silver Streak: This May Be a Trophy Season for the Cowboys, Who
Have Used Bold Moves to Rocket Back to Prominence, THE SPORTING NEWS, Nov. 16,
1992, at 12.
316 Harvey Araton, Nets Control Magic, Not O'Neal, N.Y. TniEs, Nov. 15, 1992,
§ 8, at 1 ("[T]he Magic is still an expansion team unless the 7-foot-l-inch rookie is
throwing around his 303 pounds.").
317 Schneider, supra note 238, at 812 n.110.
318 1993 NFL AGREEMENT, supra note 131, at art. XVI, § 2.
319 See Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 747 (D.D.C. 1976), modified,
593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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Allowing them pure freedom of movement could destroy competi-
tive balance.
4. Revenue Sharing
It is submitted that free agency works best when all teams
have sufficient resources to pursue players. A potential problem
area is major league baseball, where local television revenues
range from $3.5 million to $50 million per year, thus affecting the
ability to sign free agents.32 0 A possible solution is to require those
teams whose local television revenue exceeds the league average
of $10 million32 to place one-half of the excess into a fund. The
fund would then be distributed so that each team would receive a
guaranteed minimum of $10 million. Thus, Seattle would receive
$10 million instead of $3.5 million,322 while the Yankees' $50 mil-
lion3 23 would become $30 million. Any funds remaining after dis-
tribution would be returned to the contributing clubs in propor-
tion to their contribution.
5. Salary Cap
This proposal does not contemplate the existence of a salary
cap.324 It is submitted, however, that although a salary cap gener-
ally is not good for competition, it may be helpful in the NFL. As
noted earlier, the current NFL agreement tends to encourage
wealthier teams to sign many free agents 25 A salary cap may
help counteract this result, thus benefiting competition.
The NFL agreement has a provision which provides for auto-
matic implementation of a salary cap starting at 64% of revenues
if player costs reach 67% of revenues, a level which has not yet
been reached. 26 In return, the minimum years of service for be-
320 See Holtzman, supra note 272 (listing local television revenues for each base-
ball team).
321 See Louis Guth, Today's Topic: Economy of Baseball; Financial Trouble Spots
Darkest Clouds on Game's Horizon, USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 1991, at 10C.
322 Holtzman, supra note 272.
323 Id.
324 See supra notes 277-83 and accompanying text (discussing NBA salary cap).
325 See supra note 311 and accompanying text (discussing free agent moves of
New York Jets).
326 1993 NFL AGREEMENT, supra note 131, at art. XXV, §§ 2, 4(a). The agree-
ment does contain a total rookie salary cap of $2 million per team. Id. at art. XVII,
§ 3(a).
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coming an unrestricted free agent are reduced from five to four, in
consideration for implementing the cap.327
CONCLUSION
For nearly sixty years, courts were reluctant to take action
against player restraints. The past twenty years, however, have
seen a dramatic turnaround, owing to a rise in litigation brought
on by players with the backing of increasingly powerful unions.
The courts have generally been sympathetic to the players' argu-
ments and have struck down most restraints on antitrust
grounds.
Unrestricted free agency is not a desirable goal. Restrictions
help maximize player salaries while minimizing team costs. A
system with some restrictions, which allows movement through-
out a player's career, strikes the proper balance between the inter-
ests of players and clubs. It is time for players and owners to
reach some kind of agreement and take this issue out of the
courts. The fans deserve this much.
Shant H. Chalian
327 Id. at art. XIX, § 1(a).
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